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This article is the first of a two-part series in which Professor Gebbia-Pinetti considers how the complexities of state sovereign
immunity apply to bankruptcy actions. The present article lays the foundation by analyzing the source, scope, and nature of
states' immunity from suits filed in federal court to enforce state and federal law. This includes a discussion of traditional
sovereign immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, abrogation of immunity, and the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida. The second article will consider the extent to which the bankruptcy estate may enforce Bankruptcy Code
actions against the states, notwithstanding state sovereign immunity. (Forthcoming, Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice,
November/December 1998).
I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMMUNITY ENIGMA
The perplexing problem of sovereign immunity has come full circle to vex bankruptcy courts and commentators.2 This is
altogether fitting, for it was an unpaid debt (in 1793, by the state of Georgia)3 that precipitated the convoluted development of
the modern doctrine under which states may be immune from suit under federal law.4
In a bankruptcy case, the representative of the bankruptcy estate5 (the “debtor-in-possession” or “trustee”)6 might sue a state to
enforce a federal bankruptcy law cause of action that “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code, or *522  “arises in” a bankruptcy
case.7 These include actions to recover money or property from the state,8 enjoin the state from taking actions deleterious to
the debtor or the estate,9 and bind the state to the bankruptcy court's determination of the amount, nature, classification and
treatment of the state's claims against the debtor.10 The bankruptcy court may also hear state law and non-bankruptcy federal law
causes of action against the state, including traditional tort and contract claims, if those actions “relate to” the bankruptcy case.11
Suit by a bankruptcy trustee against a state presents an ironic clash between the immunity principle and bankruptcy law.
In theory, immunity arises from a desire to honor the sanctity of sovereignty.12 In practice, however, immunity is designed
to protect states' treasuries.13 Immunity is also a practical necessity because a judgment against a state cannot be enforced
peaceably *523  if the state resists.14 Immunity protects a state from its debt collectors, yet allows the state to collect its own
claims. Bankruptcy law protects a debtor from its debt collectors, yet requires that the debtor collect its own claims in order
to maximize distribution to its creditors. The trustee's ability to enforce claims against the states fosters the dual objectives
of bankruptcy law.15 The debtor-oriented goal is to accord the debtor a fresh start through a discharge of pre-petition debts.
This goal may be undermined if the trustee *524  cannot bind the state to the discharge or prevent the state from collecting its
claims after bankruptcy. The creditor-oriented goal is to maximize and equitably distribute the estate's assets. This goal may be
undermined if the trustee cannot collect money or property from the state, compel the state to return preferential transfers, or
bind the state to the court's determination of the amount, nature, priority and treatment of the state's claims.
This Article revisits immunity doctrine in order to determine the extent to which the bankruptcy estate may enforce the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code against the states. The answer to this question is complicated because the source, scope and
nature of states' immunity depend upon the court in which a suit is filed (federal or state), the law the suit seeks to enforce (federal
or state), who files a suit (private party or government), and other considerations.16 Moreover, since the very inception of federal
court jurisdiction, constitutional law scholars and Supreme Court justices have disagreed among themselves concerning the
source, scope and nature of states' immunity in federal question cases.17 These disputes have caused the justices to split five-
to-four in most of the leading Supreme Court cases dealing with constructive consent and abrogation of states' immunity.18
Consequently, it *525  is difficult to define basic immunity doctrine with sufficient confidence to predict the path the law
will take.19
The immunity enigma inheres in federalism. In a single-level government system (such as an independent nation-state), there
is only one “sovereign,” one sovereign's law, one sovereign's courts, and one sovereign's citizens. Federalism, however, creates
multiple levels of government, each with its own laws, courts, and citizens. Concurrent jurisdiction permits state courts to
exercise jurisdiction over many federal law causes of action20 (in addition to state law causes of action). Similarly, federal
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courts, including federal bankruptcy courts, exercise jurisdiction over certain state law causes of action21 (in addition to federal
law causes of action22). Before federalism, a sovereign state generally was immune from a suit filed in its own courts, by its
own citizens, to enforce its own laws.23 After federalism, it is necessary to determine whether the state also enjoys immunity
from a suit filed in (i) federal court, by its own citizens or another state's citizens, to enforce the state's own law; (ii) federal
court, by its own citizens, another state's citizens or the federal government, to enforce federal law; or (iii) state court, by its
own citizens, another state's citizens or the federal government, to enforce federal law.
Part II of this Article examines the source and scope of states' immunity from suit in federal court.24 The Eleventh Amendment,
which limits federal courts' “judicial power” over certain citizen suits against states, accords states a form of immunity.25
Supreme Court justices and constitutional law scholars have long disputed, however, whether it is the Eleventh Amendment or
traditional sovereign immunity that protects states from federal *526  question suits filed in federal court.26 The distinction
between these two sources of immunity is critical because they differ markedly in nature.
Part III examines the nature of states' immunity in federal court. The nature of states' immunity determines the circumstances
in which immunity may be eliminated. There is no doubt that states may waive traditional state court immunity. Similarly,
Supreme Court decisions have long suggested that states may waive their federal court immunity. In recent decades, the Court
has also suggested that immunity is malleable enough to permit Congress either to condition a state's participation in federal
programs on the state's constructive consent to federal court enforcement, or to abrogate states' immunity under specific federal
laws.27 In 1996, however, in the now-infamous Seminole case,28 the Supreme Court held that Congress has no power to
“abrogate” states' immunity except pursuant to the express authority of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Seminole reasoned that
states' immunity from citizen suits filed in federal court to enforce federal law arises solely under the Eleventh Amendment,
and that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a constitutional limit on federal courts' jurisdiction. This rationale compels a re-
examination of constructive consent, abrogation, and the nature of states' federal court immunity.30 Part III of this Article
discusses abrogation, Seminole, and Seminole's impact on immunity and abrogation doctrine.31
Parts IV and V will appear in the November/December issue of the Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice.
*527  Part IV.A applies immunity and abrogation doctrine in the bankruptcy context. It considers whether states are entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy court (Part IV.A.1), whether a bankruptcy case is a “suit against the state”
for Eleventh Amendment purposes (Part IV.A.2), and whether Congress may abrogate states' immunity under the Bankruptcy
Code using its Fourteenth Amendment powers (Part IV.A.3).
If states are immune from suit in bankruptcy cases and Congress cannot abrogate states' immunity, how can the bankruptcy
trustee enforce the Bankruptcy Code against recalcitrant states? Part IV.B analyzes five possible means of enforcing the
Bankruptcy Code against the states after Seminole: (i) suit in federal bankruptcy court with the state's consent or waiver (Part
IV.B.1), (ii) suit in state court with or without the state's consent (Part IV.B.2), (iii) Supreme Court review of a federal bankruptcy
law question determined in state court (Part IV.B.3), (iv) suit against a state official to compel the state to comply with federal
bankruptcy law (Part IV.B.4),32 and (v) federal government enforcement (Part IV.B.5).
Part V summarizes my conclusions with respect to states' immunity and makes recommendations with respect to enforcing the
Bankruptcy Code against the states.
II. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE SOURCE, NATURE AND SCOPE OF STATES'
IMMUNITY
The Constitution creates a federal forum with judicial power over certain state law actions in which the state is a party,33 and
federal law actions without regard to the nature of the parties.34 Parts II.A and II.B consider whether states were immune from
suits filed in this new, federal forum35 to enforce state law and federal law, respectively, prior to the Eleventh Amendment. Part
II.C examines the scope and nature of the Eleventh Amendment. Parts II.D and II.E examine the Eleventh Amendment's impact
on states' immunity from suits filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisidiction, respectively.
*528  A. State Law in Federal Courts: Diversity Jurisdiction Before the Eleventh Amendment
Suppose that a citizen of State B sues State A under state law to collect a debt. If the citizen sues State A in State A's own courts,
State A probably would be entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense, under State A's law.36 If the citizen sues State A
in another state, such as State B,37 State A might be entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense, under State B's law.38
Diversity jurisdiction allows the citizen of State B to sue State A in federal court. Can the state assert immunity as a defense in
federal court? The answer depends on two questions that define the source and scope of states' immunity.
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First, would the state have been immune under traditional common law sovereign immunity? Second, how did the Constitution
affect traditional common law immunity with respect to diversity suits?
If, under the common law, the state had been immune only from suits filed in its own courts, then the state would seem to be
subject to suit in federal court, unless the Constitution expanded immunity to cover suits in federal court. If, instead, the state
had been immune from suits filed in any court, then the state would seem to be immune from suit filed in federal court, unless
the Constitution eliminated states' immunity with respect to diversity suits filed in federal court.
Before the Eleventh Amendment, the only provision of the Constitution that referred to the states' status in federal court was
the diversity jurisdiction grant of Article III itself. Article III vests the “judicial power” of the United States in the Supreme
Court and such lower courts as Congress may establish39 and extends the judicial power to “Controversies between a State and
Citizens of another State” (among other bases of jurisdiction).40 This aspect of diversity jurisdiction may have been designed
to protect citizens of one state from being sued by another state in that state's own courts. Its effect, however, is to grant federal
courts jurisdiction over state law causes of action that previously would have been heard in state court. Article III gives *529  no
express guidance concerning how this broad jurisdictional grant might affect states' immunity. Does Article III retain, expand,
or eliminate states' common law immunity in diversity cases?
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the well-known, pre-Eleventh Amendment case of Chisholm v. Georgia.41 In
Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina42 sued the state of Georgia to collect a debt. Although the complaint was based upon
a state law cause of action, diversity jurisdiction allowed the citizen to sue in federal court. To Georgia (and other interested
states) the issue was simple: if Georgia was immune from suit without its consent under the common law, could the mere
coincidence of diversity jurisdiction eviscerate that immunity and subject Georgia to suit in federal court without its consent?
The answer, according to the Supreme Court, was “yes.” The Court held (in a four-to-one split)43 that Georgia had no immunity
against a diversity suit commenced in federal court. The majority reasoned that the plain meaning of Article III's citizen-
state diversity clause allows federal courts to hear citizen suits against unconsenting states,44 and that the federal judicial
power obviates any immunity the states might have enjoyed outside of federal court.45 According to Chisholm, the “deal” to
which federalism bound the states required states to forego federal court immunity as part of the price of joining the union.
Consequently, a citizen of State B frustrated by State A's state court immunity could simply circumvent that immunity by suing
State A in federal court. The majority justices viewed this result as critical to the stability of the new nation.
The separate opinions of the four majority justices reflect divergent views, however, concerning the nature of states' sovereignty.
Two of the majority justices simply assumed that Article III eliminated whatever immunity states *530  may have enjoyed in
state court.46 The other two justices argued that, under the Constitution, sovereignty rests in the people, as a sovereign superior
to the states. In the exercise of their sovereign power, the people could and did establish the Constitution, which subjects the
states to suit in federal court without the states' consent.47
The fifth justice, Justice Iredell, argued that the majority erred in its vision of both the nature of states' sovereignty and the manner
in which federalism affected states' sovereign immunity.48 He argued that states were, indeed, sovereign and that immunity
from suit was so essential to states' sovereignty that it could not be eliminated in a manner that was, to his view, as indirect as
Article III's grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts.49 Under Justice Iredell's approach, the federal courts received their
power not directly from Article III's jurisdictional grant but only from laws that Congress enacted to implement Article III.50
The relevent federal law, the Judiciary Act of 1789, granted the federal courts authority to exercise their jurisdiction only in a
manner “agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”51 Justice Iredell concluded that such an indirect grant did not abrogate
states' immunity because no existing principle of law allowed a citizen to sue a state without the state's consent.52
Not surprisingly, the Chisholm decision generated howls of protest by the *531  states.53 Not only was the decision an affront
to states' view of the privileges of sovereignty, but the specter of citizen suits threatened to deplete state treasuries at a time
when states were struggling desperately to rebuild after the revolutionary war.54
B. Federal Law in Federal Courts: Federal Question Jurisdiction Before the Eleventh Amendment
Chisolm's reasoning would seem to extend to federal question suits filed in federal court as well as to diversity suits.
Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over federal question actions, just as it grants federal courts jurisdiction over diversity
actions.55 If Article III's grant of diversity jurisdiction obviates any immunity the states might have enjoyed outside of federal
court in suits to enforce state law, then Article III's grant of federal question jurisdiction would seem to obviate any immunity
the states might have enjoyed outside of federal court in suits to enforce federal law.56 Moreover, citizen suits to enforce federal
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law pose the same threat to the state's treasury (to the extent they seek money damages), and the same challenge to the states'
notions of sovereignty as do diversity suits. Consequently, under Chisholm's reasoning (if valid), there would appear to be no
basis upon which states would be immune from suit in federal court to enforce federal law, at least prior to the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment. If, however, Justice Iredell's reasoning is valid, and is extended to federal question cases, than states
probably would be immune in federal question suits, but Congress might have the power to abrogate states' immunity.57
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified before the Court definitively *532  determined whether states were immune from suit
filed in federal court to enforce federal law.58
C. The Nature and Scope of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The day after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Chisholm, a resolution designed to amend the Constitution to overrule
Chisholm was introduced in the House of Representatives.59 The broadly worded resolution, if enacted, would have “enshrin[ed]
state sovereign immunity in federal courts for all cases.”60 The source of states' immunity in federal court would clearly have
been the Constitution itself (i.e., the proposed Amendment) and the scope would have broadly included any federal court
suit.61 The following day, a more narrowly worded resolution, referring only to suits commenced against a state by citizens of
other states or of foreign nations, was introduced in the Senate.62 Congress and the states ultimately ratified, as the Eleventh
Amendment, the narrower Senate resolution (with the addition of three words, the significance of which is disputed).63 The
Amendment (with the added words emphasized) provides that: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”64
*533  The Eleventh Amendment became effective on January 8, 1798.65 Courts and scholars have struggled to define its nature
and scope ever since.66
As to its nature, the challenge lies in determining the extent to which Eleventh Amendment immunity is similar in character
to traditional common law sovereign immunity. If Eleventh Amendment and traditional immunity are identical in nature, it
would not matter whether a state's immunity arose under one or the other. If, however, Eleventh Amendment and traditional
immunity are different in nature, then the source of states' immunity becomes crucial in determining ancillary issues such as
whether immunity may be waived or abrogated. The nature of states' immunity is examined infra in the context of abrogation,
waiver and consent, and federal question cases filed in state court.67
As to scope, Eleventh Amendment immunity is narrower than traditional immunity because the Eleventh Amendment protects
the state against some, but not all, suits commenced in federal court.68 Two clauses of the Eleventh Amendment determine which
federal court suits fall within its scope: the “citizen-state” clause and the “judicial power” clause. First, the Amendment applies
only to suits against states by citizens of other states or of foreign states. Although the Court has interpreted “citizen” broadly
to prohibit federal court suits against a state by private parties other than individual citizens, such as Indian tribes and federal
corporations,69 the Amendment does not prohibit the federal government or other states from suing a state in federal court.70
The more perplexing question is whether the citizen-state clause only bars suits against states by citizens of other states (in
accord with the Amendment's language), or whether it also bar suits against states by their own citizens (in accordance with
some broader principle of immunity). This issue arises only if the Eleventh Amendment applies to federal question suits because
diversity suits necessarily involve a state and a citizen of a different state. This reveals the second scope question, which is
whether the “judicial *534  power” clause prohibits citizen suits against states only under diversity jurisdiction (Part II.D) or
also under federal question (and other federal court subject matter) jurisdiction (Part II.E)?
D. Diversity Jurisdiction After the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment clearly bars a Chisholm-type suit, i.e., a diversity jurisdiction suit, filed in federal court, by citizens of
one state against another state, to collect a debt under state law.71 The Amendment was enacted directly in response to Chisholm
(a diversity suit),72 and the Amendment's “judicial power” clause and “citizen suit” clause both clearly apply to diversity suits.
First, federal courts' “judicial powers,” which are restrained by the Eleventh Amendment, clearly include citizen-state diversity
jurisdiction under Article III.73 Indeed, the language of the Amendment closely parallels the language of Article III's citizen-state
diversity clause.74 Under Article III, the “judicial power” of the United States extends to (among other things) “Controversies
between a State and Citizens of another State.”75 Under the Eleventh Amendment, the “judicial power” of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to “any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State.”76
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Second, the Amendment's language expressly applies to suits by citizens of one state against another state.77 Consequently,
Article III's grant to federal courts of diversity jurisdiction no longer extends to diversity suits against states.
*535  Courts and scholars agree that the Eleventh Amendment applies to diversity suits.78 The more difficult questions arise
when the history, language and policies of the Amendment are applied to federal question suits against states.
E. Federal Question Jurisdiction After the Eleventh Amendment
Since the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently held that states enjoy immunity from
citizen suits filed in federal court to enforce federal law.79 The Supreme Court justices have not, however, unanimously
identified the Eleventh Amendment as the source of that immunity. While some justices root states' federal question immunity
in the Eleventh Amendment,80 others find it in some generalized constitutional or extra-constitutional common law immunity
doctrine.81 Several opinions navigate among these conflicting views by employing carefully vague language concerning the
source of states' immunity in federal question cases.82
These divergent views are best understood against the backdrop of Hans *536  v. Louisiana.83 Hans is an early, leading case
in which the Supreme Court was asked to define the source and scope of states' immunity in federal question suits filed in
federal court.84
In Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued Louisiana in federal court alleging that Louisiana had repudiated its debts in violation of the
Constitution's Contract Clause.85 Louisiana had amended its constitution to require that certain taxes, which had been collected
to pay interest on state-issued bonds purchased by the plaintiff and others, be used instead to pay state government expenses.86
Louisiana claimed immunity.
Hans differed from Chisholm in two important ways. First, the Court viewed the case as raising a federal Contract Clause issue
(rather than a simple state law debt collection issue).87 Second, the plaintiffs in Hans had sued their own state. The plaintiffs
cited both of these differences to counter Louisiana's immunity defense. First, they argued that states enjoyed no immunity from
suits that seek to remedy violations of federal law (in contrast to diversity suits, which seek to remedy violations of state law).
Second, because the Eleventh Amendment expressly refers only to suits against states by citizens of other states, the plaintiffs
argued that the Amendment could not apply to a suit by the state's own citizens.88
The Court in Hans held that states do enjoy immunity in federal question cases and that citizens cannot sue either their own
state or another state in federal court to enforce federal law under federal question jurisdiction.89 Hans's reasoning, however,
created confusion that remains to this day  *537  concerning the source of states' immunity in federal question cases. Courts
and scholars have constructed at least four different interpretations of Hans-type immunity, all of which are consistent with
the result in Hans, and each of which arguably is supported by selected language in Hans.90 The following discussion of these
interpretations moves from roughly the broadest to the narrowest interpretation of the Amendment.
First, under an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment (the “expansive view”), Eleventh Amendment immunity applies
to both diversity and federal question suits filed against a state in federal court by the state's own citizens or another state's
citizens.91 This view cannot be reconciled with the language of the Amendment, because the Amendment *538  refers only
to suits against a state by citizens of another state.92 The Hans Court was troubled, however, by the apparent anomaly of
prohibiting suits by citizens of other states but permitting suits by citizens of the same state.93 To avoid this result, the Court
reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment would never have been adopted if it had expressly permitted a citizen to sue its own state
in federal court to enforce federal law.94 The expansive view interprets this comment to mean that the Eleventh Amendment's
language is merely illustrative of a much broader principle of sovereign immunity that the Eleventh Amendment itself (rather
than some other source of immunity) actually embodies.95 Five of the current Supreme Court justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) have embraced this expansive view of the Eleventh Amendment.96
Second, under a textual reading of the Eleventh Amendment (the “textual view”), Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only
to diversity suits and to federal question suits filed against states by citizen of other states (“non- *539  citizens”).97 States
enjoy immunity in federal question suits filed in federal court by the states' own citizens, but that immunity arises only under
the common law.98 Again, Hans may be read as supporting this approach.
The Hans Court began its analysis by implying that the Court had already determined that the Eleventh Amendment granted
states immunity in federal question cases filed by non-citizens.99 In the earlier cases to which the Court referred, non-citizens
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had sued state officials alleging violations of the Contract Clause. In each case, the Court had held that the suit was barred
because the suit was virtually against the state itself, rather than the state official.100 Although none of these cases held that
the Eleventh Amendment applies to federal question suits,101 Hans concluded that the Court necessarily had assumed that the
underlying federal question actions against the states would have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment.102 To avoid an
anomolous result under which suits by non-citizens would be barred but suits by citizens would be allowed, Hans suggested
that the Eleventh Amendment is not the only basis for states' immunity:
In the present case the plaintiff in error contends that he, being a citizen of Louisiana, is not embarrassed by the
obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that Amendment only prohibits suits against a State which
are brought by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State. It is true, the amendment
does so read: and if there were no other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable; and
then we should have this anomolous result ...103
To avoid this result, Hans arguably concludes that Louisiana's immunity *540  in a same-citizen suit arises not from the
Eleventh Amendment (the language of which does not encompass same-citizen suits) but rather from some form of common
law immunity that applies to matters not covered by the Amendment.104 In other words, Hans may have applied the Eleventh
Amendment to suits by non-citizens and applied common law to suits by citizens. This interpretation has garnered a small
following among scholars and has prevailed in several opinions by Justice Brennan.105 Under this view, most of the leading
federal question immunity cases would not raise Eleventh Amendment issues at all because they involve suits by citizens against
their own states.106
Third, under a narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only to diversity jurisdiction
suits and common law immunity applies to federal question suits (the “diversity” view). This view prevailed in the past with
Justices Marshall, Blackmun (and Brennan, *541  in some opinions),107 prevails today with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Stevens,108 and is widely espoused by constitutional law scholars.109 The diversity view may be difficult to reconcile
with Hans's suggestion that earlier cases applied the Eleventh Amendment to non-citizen federal question cases, or with the
commonly held view that Hans interpreted the Amendment itself as embodying some broader principle of immunity than
that which is included in its express words.110 Nevertheless, Hans is less than clear concerning the source of states' federal
question immunity. Hans arguably may have employed common law immunity to supplement rather than expand the scope
of the Eleventh Amendment, such that the Amendment applies to diversity cases and the common law applies to both citizen
and non-citizen federal question cases. More importantly, however, advocates argue that the diversity interpretation is true
to the language, history and purposes of the Amendment (some add that Hans should be overruled to the extent that it holds
otherwise).111 Because of its popularity and its significant impact on the doctrinal coherence of concepts such as waiver and
abrogation, it is useful to consider briefly the principal arguments supporting the diversity view.
Diversity proponents argue that the text of the Amendment applies awkwardly, at best, to federal question jurisdiction. The
Eleventh Amendment's “judicial power” clause (which limits federal courts' judicial power with respect to “any suit”) arguably
limits federal courts' “judicial power” *542  with respect to federal question suits as well as diversity suits.112 The Amendment's
“citizen-state” clause, however, does not neatly parallel the Constitution's grant of federal question jurisdiction in the way that it
neatly parallels the grant of diversity jurisdiction.113 If the Amendment were applied as written to federal question suits, it would
prohibit federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits against states by other citizens of other states, but permit federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits against states by citizens of the same state. Many scholars find nothing in the history or
purposes of the Amendment to support this anomoly.114 Consequently, they conclude that this incongruity demonstrates that
the Amendment simply does not apply to federal question actions at all.115 They explain the Amendment's language by noting
that Article III creates jurisdiction based upon subject matter (e.g., federal question) and the status of the parties (e.g., diversity).
A federal question case may, incidentally, be commenced by a citizen of one state against another state. Nevertheless, because
the Eleventh Amendment refers only to the status of the parties, it limits only Article III's party-status jurisdiction against the
states (i.e., diversity), not its subject matter jurisdiction against the states (i.e., federal question).116
If the Eleventh Amendment had been designed to extend to federal question jurisdiction, it could have been drafted more
broadly to include same-state citizen suits.117 On the other hand, if the Amendment had been designed to apply only to diversity
suits, more precise drafting might have obviated *543  questions concerning its extension to other bases of federal court
jurisdiction.118)
Diversity advocates turn next to the history of the Amendment. They argue that the drafters never intended and the ratifiers never
imagined that the Eleventh Amendment would be applied to bar federal court jurisdiction over suits against states to enforce
federal law.119 This view rests, in part, in the fact that the Amendment was enacted in response to a diversity suit (Chisholm), and
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that the debates leading to the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment did not expressly focus on federal question jurisdiction.120
Some add that the drafters did not mention federal question jurisdiction or draft the Amendment broadly to include federal
question jurisdiction because no one thought that states were immune from federal question suits.121 Others suggest that the
drafters did consider federal question suits and expressly *544  rejected the earlier proposal to ensure that the Amendment
would not apply to federal question suits.122
Finally, it could be argued that an Eleventh Amendment limited in scope to diversity suits would establish a coherent immunity
policy by ensuring that federal laws may be enforced in federal courts.123
Although the diversity view enjoys wide support, there is yet a fourth interpretation of Hans. Under this view, advanced by
federalism scholar Professor Martha A. Field, the Eleventh Amendment simply preserves traditional common law immunity
by overuling Chisholm (“common law view”).124 Chisholm held that Article III eliminated common law immunity. In dissent,
Justice Iredell argued that Article III had no effect on states' pre-existing common law immunity. Professor Field argues that the
drafters, in fact, were split on this issue. The Eleventh Amendment, however, overruled Chisholm and, thereby, adopted the view
that Article III does not affect states' immunity. Consequently, Hans rejected the Chisholm majority view and embraced Justice
Iredell's argument.125 This may suggest that Hans saw the Eleventh Amendment as simply restoring common law immunity
with respect to both diversity and federal question suits.126
If the immunity states enjoy in federal court in both diversity and federal question cases arises solely from the common law, and
the Eleventh Amendment *545  does not add any new type of immunity, is the Eleventh Amendment superfluous? Professor
Field argues that it is not because the Eleventh Amendment was a necessary means of instructing courts not to interpret Article
III as eliminating states' immunity, after Chisholm mistakenly read Article III as eliminating states' immunity.127 In this sense,
the Eleventh Amendment serves as something of an interpretive guide to the proper reading of Article III.128
Initially, Professor Field's view may seem difficult to reconcile with the Eleventh Amendment's distinction between citizens
and non-citizens.129 Professor Field argues, however, that the Amendment distinguishes non-citizen suits and citizen suits
because the Amendment was designed to reverse the implication that Article III allows suits against states by non-citizens under
diversity jurisdiction. Because there was no implication that Article III allowed suits against states by their own citizens, there
was no need to refer to such suits in the Amendment.130
In summary, more than one hundred years after Hans, courts and scholars continue to debate the source of Hans-type immunity.
Hans's ambiguity arises, in part, because the Hans Court may have been driven more by a desire to achieve a satisfactory
result than by a desire to develop a coherent theory. The Hans decision is peppered with dicta suggesting that the result was
motivated by political pressure, public sentiment, a desire to protect the Court's credibility, and a deep concern for the political
repurcussions the Court foresaw flowing from a denial of states' immunity. The majority apparently believed that a decision
denying states immunity would promptly be overruled by a constitutional amendment. The Court had been chastized by the
constitutional amendment overruling Chisholm, and it feared that the Court's authority could be undermined if it issued an
opinion as unpopular *546  as Chisholm.131 Not surprisingly, courts, commentators and even the concurrence in Hans have
shied away from Hans's forthright admission that political motivation influenced the decision.132 These motivations may,
however, have overshadowed concerns for developing a coherent theory of state immunity in federal court.
The absence of a coherent theory of states' federal court immunity is not merely of academic interest. Rather, it seriously
undermines efforts to determine how to enforce federal law against the states after Hans. If states are immune from suits filed by
citizens in federal court to enforce federal law, it is necessary to identify alternative means of enforcing federal law against the
states. Hans casts a long shadow on this enterprise because the viability of alternate methods of enforcing federal law against
the states depends in large part on questions left open by Hans concerning the source, scope and nature of states' immunity.
The most significant question in this regard is whether states' immunity from suits filed in federal court to enforce federal law
arises under the Constitution itself (through the Eleventh Amendment) or under the common law. Both the “diversity” and the
“common law” interpretations (the third and fourth views discussed above) argue that states' immunity with respect to federal
question cases arises under the common law. In contrast, under the “expansive” interpretation (the first view discussed above),
the Eleventh Amendment applies to all federal question suits against states, and under the “textual” interpretation (the second
view discussed above), the Eleventh Amendment applies to some federal question suits against states (those by non-citizens).
The result in Hans would be the same under any of these views. The distinction between a common law and a constitutional
foundation for immunity is fundamental, however, to determining important ancillary issues that were not even raised in Hans,
such as whether Congress can abrogate states' immunity.133
Part III examines congressional abrogation of states' federal court immunity.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF STATES' FEDERAL COURT IMMUNITY
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If states are immune from citizen suits filed in federal court to enforce *547  federal law, how can citizens compel states to
comply with federal laws, such as the Bankruptcy Code? For two decades,134 Congressional abrogation of states' immunity
seemed to provide a broad and effective means of enforcing federal law against unconsenting states.135
A. Abrogation: Revisiting the Source and Nature of States' Federal Court Immunity
This Part defines the interplay between states' immunity and Congress' legislative powers.
Many scholars agree that if states' federal court immunity in federal question cases is based upon the common law (as under the
diversity or common law interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment), then Congress may abrogate states' immunity. If states'
immunity is a constitutional right, however, then Congress may not abrogate states' immunity.136 The underlying premise is
simple: Congress has the power to alter common law through legislation enacted under Congress' enumerated powers,137 but
Congress has no power to amend the Constitution by legislative fiat.
Other scholars suggest that, even if the Constitution grants states immunity, *548  Congress may abrogate immunity under
the exercise of its enumerated powers. The premise is that even constitutional immunity may be subject to abrogation under an
equal and countervailing constitutional power. This countervailing power is found in the broad legislative powers granted to
Congress (under Article I and several of the constitutional Amendments) to enact federal laws.138
Both approaches assume that states agreed to forego some measure of immunity when they ratified a Constitution that grants
Congress the power to legislate in particular areas and to bind the states to that legislation.139
Several Supreme Court cases decided beginning in the late 1960s suggested that Congress might have the power to abrogate
states' immunity. These cases arose in the context of whether the state had constructively consented to suit by engaging in
activity that it knew Congress had regulated.
In the first case, Parden v. Terminal Railway,140 citizens of Alabama sued an Alabama state-owned railroad in federal court to
enforce provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (“FELA”).141 FELA's regulatory scheme applies to “every common
carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate] commerce” and FELA allows citizens to commence enforcement actions in
federal court.142
Even though FELA does not expressly mention states, the five-justice majority concluded that Congress had intended to subject
state-owned railroads to liability under FELA because FELA applies to all common carriers.143 The majority then held that:
By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States empowered *549  Congress to create such a right of action against
interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad
in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in
interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have consented to suit.144
The four dissenters agreed that Congress has the power to condition a state's participation in interstate transportation on the
state's waiver of immunity from suits arising from that activity. Essentially, the state could choose either to forego the activity
or to consent to federal court suit for claims that arise from the activity.145 The dissenters argued, however, that Congress
could impose such a condition only by a statement of “unmistakable clarity” in the statute. FELA's general reference to “every
common carrier,” without any specific reference to states, they argued, did not meet this clear statement requirement.146
In the ensuing decades, the Court considered the degree of clarity necessary to require the states to waive immunity as a condition
of participating in regulated activity. In Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare,147 state employees sued a state
agency under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).148 The FLSA allowed employees to sue in federal court and had recently
been amended to add employees of certain state institutions to the definition of persons entitled to recover damages.149 The six-
justice majority distinguished Parden but did not reject its rationale. The Court reasoned that the amendment, which allowed
employees of certain state institutions to sue their employers but did not modify the provision allowing suit in federal court, did
not clearly evince a congressional intent to condition states' operation of those institutions on a waiver of immunity.150
The two-justice concurrence argued that states' federal court immunity was a constitutional protection that could be overcome
only by the states' consent. The concurrence reasoned that the state could not have consented to *550  suit because it had been
operating the institutions before the FLSA had been amended to apply to employees of those institutions.151
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One year later, in Edelman v. Jordan,152 the Court considered a citizen suit filed under the predecessor to the Social Security
Act. The Act did not contain a provision allowing citizens to recover benefits that states had wrongfully withheld in the past.153
The Court concluded that neither Parden nor Employees applied because “in this case the threshold fact of congressional
authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent.”154
The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amendment was found in those cases to turn on whether Congress had
intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and whether the State by its participation in the program authorized by Congress
had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity.155
Edelman added that “constructive consent,” under which a state consents to suit merely by participating in a federal program,
is not a viable means of waiving immunity under a statute that does not apply to the states.156 Edelman did not expressly reject
Parden, but held that neither abrogation nor waiver could apply unless Congress had created a cause of action against the states.
In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation,157 decided twenty-three years after Parden, the Court
significantly limited Parden's reach. A plurality of the Court158 held that a congressional intent to subject states to suit in federal
court must be “expressed in unmistakable *551  statutory language.”159 Welch overruled Parden “to the extent that Parden
... is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed
in unmistakably clear language.”160
Welch did not, however, expressly question Parden's holding that Congress has the power to condition states' participation in
federal programs on a waiver of immunity.161 Morevoer, Employees, Edelman, and Welch all suggested that Congress could
impose such a condition even if states' federal court immunity was constitutionally required.162 None of these cases suggested,
however, that Congress could absolutely abrogate states' immunity without the states' constructive consent.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,163 in contrast, the Court held that Congress could abrogate states' immunity without the states'
consent.164 In Fitzpatrick, male governmental employees and retirees, all of whom were Connecticut *552  citizens, sued the
State of Connecticut165 in federal court, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”).166 They alleged that Connecticut's statutory retirement plan discriminated against them based upon their gender
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as implemented by Title VII.167 In 1972, Congress had amended Title VII to include
state governments in the definition of employers subject to private citizen suits, and to include state governmental employees
in the definition of persons permitted to sue their employers on their own behalfs.168
Connecticut argued that it had not consented to the suit and that abrogation without consent violated the Eleventh
Amendment.169 The Court disagreed.
First, the Court held that Congress did have the power to abrogate states' immunity.170 The Court supported this conclusion
with a narrow rationale that relied heavily upon Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers.171 The Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority reasoned, had fundamentally altered the federal-state balance of power that had existed at the time of the Eleventh
Amendment by expanding federal power at the expense of state power.172 The Court concluded that this shift of power had
granted Congress authority to abrogate states' immunity.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified one hundred years after the Eleventh Amendment.173 Second, the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly imposes substantive duties upon the states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State *553  deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.174
Third, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly authorizes Congress to enforce the Amendment “by appropriate
legislation.”175 The Court concluded that:
[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], not only is it exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
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section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state
authority.176
The Court's focus on the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the Court
accepted the Eleventh Amendment (rather than the common law or some general constitutional principle) as the source of states'
immunity, even in same-state citizen federal question suits. The Court found in the Fourteenth Amendment an equivalent and
countervailing constitutional principle that permitted Congress to abrogate states' immunity. Justice Brennan, however, in his
concurring opinion, continued to argue that only common law immunity applied to same-state citizen federal question suits.
He would have concluded that Congress had authority to abrogate states' common law immunity under the enumerated powers
of both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment.177
Second, the Fitzpatrick Court held that Congress had, indeed, expressly abrogated states' immunity in the 1972 Amendments
to Title VII.178
Later cases articulated Fitzpatrick's holding as a two-prong test. To abrogate immunity Congress must, first, act “pursuant to
a valid exercise of power”179 and, second, “unequivocally express its intention to abrogate” *554  states' immunity and make
its “intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” itself.180
In the years following Fitzpatrick, several cases in which plaintiffs argued that Congress had abrogated states' immunity were
dismissed for lack of an unmistakably clear, unequivocal statutory abrogation.181 A number of these cases arose under federal
statutes enacted pursuant to clauses of the Constitution other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court was not, however,
required to determine whether Fitzpatrick's reasoning was limited to Fourteenth Amendment statutes because none of the other
statutes contained a clear and unequivocal abrogation of states' immunity.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company,182 however, involved an Interstate Commerce Clause statute that contained a clear
attempt to abrogate states' immunity. In Union Gas, the federal government had sued Union Gas in *555  federal court under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”)183 to recover clean-up
costs relating to the nation's first superfund site.184 Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania as an “owner
or operator” of the site.185
The “abrogation” clause was contained in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”),186 which
was enacted while the case was pending. SARA amended CERCLA to (i) add states to the definition of “owners or operators”
who could be liable for clean-up costs, and (ii) provide that states could be sued under CERCLA “in the same manner and to
the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity,” with limited exceptions.187 Five justices
agreed188 that SARA's language clearly and unequivocally revealed a congressional intent to abrogate states' immunity from
citizen suits filed in federal court to collect monetary damages from states.189
The Court then considered the scope of Congress' power to abrogate states' federal court immunity. Fitzpatrick had established
Congress' power to abrogate states' immunity under a statute enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Union Gas
interpreted a statute enacted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Fitzpatrick majority's heavy reliance on the unique
characteristics of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested that this distinction might be critical.190 In Union Gas, however, Justice
Brennan's four-justice plurality opinion obviated the distinction by extending *556  Fitzpatrick's Fourteenth Amendment
analysis to the Interstate Commerce Clause.191
Justice Brennan reasoned that (i) the Commerce Clause, like the Fourteenth Amendment, expands federal power at the expense
of state power, and (ii) the states relinquished whatever immunity they may previously have enjoyed when they granted Congress
plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce.192
Justice Brennan dismissed arguments that the Eleventh Amendment superseded the Commerce Clause and prohibited Congress
from abrogating states' immunity. First, he reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment merely preserved and embodied a principle
of sovereign immunity that predated the Constitution. The Constitution granted Congress the power to abrogate this immunity
under the Commerce Clause.193 In other words, even if states' federal court immunity in federal question cases has a
constitutional basis under the Eleventh Amendment, Congress may abrogate states' immunity. This is because the Constitution
itself contains both the grant of immunity and the countervailing principle that permits Congress to abrogate that immunity.194
This reasoning revisits and expands the reasoning of the portion of Parden that Welch did not overrule.195 Parden and its
progeny reasoned that Congress, using its Article I powers, could condition states' participation in federally regulated activities
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on the states' consent to private, federal court enforcement suits.196 The Union Gas plurality, in contrast, held that Congress,
using its Interstate Commerce Clause powers, could abrogate states' immunity without the states' consent.
Union Gas's reasoning on this issue logically extends to the Bankruptcy Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, and a variety of
other provisions of Article I, under which states cede power to the federal government. Indeed, *557  the language of Ex parte
Virginia,197 upon which both Fitzpatrick and Union Gas rely heavily, applies easily to all of Congress' enumerated powers:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions
of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action,
however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion
of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United
States, empowered Congress to enact .... Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a
corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.198
Because both Ex parte Virginia and Fitzpatrick involved Fourteenth Amendment statutes, each found Congress' abrogation
power in the implementing section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution, however, contains a similar implementing
provision that applies to the Interstate Commerce Clause, Indian Commerce Clause, and Bankruptcy Clause: “Congress shall
have the Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States ....”199
Second, although Justice Brennan's abrogation rationale alone would justify the result, he went further. In a significant departure
from earlier cases, Justice Brennan reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment does not impose any limit whatsoever on Congress'
power. Instead, he argued that the three words “be construed to” that were added before the Amendment was enacted were
designed simply to ensure that the Courts would not read Article III of the Constitution alone as an abrogation of states'
immunity.200 *558  The Amendment did not, however, prevent Congress from abrogating immunity under its enumerated
powers.201 Moreover, if the Eleventh Amendment does not limit federal courts' judicial powers, abrogation does not improperly
expand federal courts' judicial powers under Article III.202
Justice Brennan's reasoning allowed the plurality easily to reconcile Hans.203 The citizen in Hans sought to enforce the Contract
Clause directly, without the benefit of any federal law under which Congress had abrogated states' immunity.204 According
to the Union Gas plurality, Hans was correctly decided because, although Congress had power to abrogate states' immunity
under laws enacted to implement the Contract Clause, it had not done so.205 Fitzpatrick and Union Gas, in contrast, interpreted
laws under which Congress had expressly abrogated states' immunity. Thus, Union Gas seemed to create doctrinal coherence
by establishing a plausible interpretation of immunity doctrine without overruling any of the Court's prior decisions.206
Finally, the plurality's reasoning seemed to obviate the troubling “common *559  law versus constitutional principle” question
that had split the justices in earlier cases. Under Justice Brennan's rationale, Congress can abrogate states' immunity even if
that immunity arises from a constitutional grant. Immunity is subject to an equal constitutional power that allows Congress to
abrogate immunity under its enumerated powers.207 The common law / constitutional principle distinction had not disappeared,
however. It figured prominently in both Justice Stevens' concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent, and it resurfaced seven years
later in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,208 which overruled Union Gas.
Justice Stevens (who joined the plurality but also wrote a separate concurring opinion in Union Gas) embraced the diversity
interpretation of the *560  Eleventh Amendment.209 He distinguished “two Eleventh Amendments.”210 The first, the Eleventh
Amendment itself, imposes a constitutional limit on federal courts' judicial power. Because the Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional bar applies only to diversity jurisdiction, however, it has no application in federal question cases.211 According
to Justice Stevens, federal question cases involve a second form of immunity, which arises from the common law, not the
Eleventh Amendment. Congress may abrogate common law sovereign immunity but may not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity.212 Prior Court decisions, beginning with Hans, that seem to apply the Eleventh Amendment rather than common
law immunity in federal question cases have complicated immunity doctrine and compelled the Court to create confusing
exceptions.213 Justice Stevens attempted to resolve this doctrinal incoherence by reinterpreting earlier federal question cases
as cases in which the Court “abstained” from hearing suits against states based upon a “prudential balancing of federal and
state interests.”214 In other words, the federal courts were not barred from hearing such suits, but they abstained in the interests
of federalism and comity.215 If states' immunity in federal question cases arises only under the common law, rather than
the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, then consent, waiver and abrogation do not raise doctrinal problems.216 Justice
Stevens acknowledged, however, that this approach restated the rationales of the Court's earlier cases.217
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART ONE], 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 521
 © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia argued that states' federal court immunity in federal question cases arises from a constitutional
grant that Congress cannot abrogate.218 Justice Scalia generalized the Court's prior immunity cases as presenting a distinction
between a “comprehensive” and a “noncomprehensive” *561  view of the Eleventh Amendment.219 Under the comprehensive
view, the Eleventh Amendment's language embodies the full extent of states' immunity in federal court. If this view had
been adopted, the dissent would have interpreted the Amendment to apply only to diversity cases. The dissent agreed that the
distinction the Amendment draws between same-state citizen suits and other-state citizen suits would make no sense if it were
applied to federal question cases.220 The dissent argued, however, that the Hans Court rejected this “comprehensive” view in
favor of a “non-comprehensive” view of the Eleventh Amendment. Under the latter view, Hans and its progeny confirm that
state sovereign immunity is a fundamental right, embodied in the Constitution, and illustrated by (although not fully expressed
in) the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment merely presents an example of part of the doctrine's scope.221 Without
expressly embracing this interpretation, Justice Scalia argued that Hans's approach was too ingrained to be reversed.222
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the only dispute has been over the extent to which the states waived their immunity under
the constitutional plan. He conceded that the states waived immunity in federal question suits filed by the United States,223
and by other states.224 According to Justice Scalia, this establishes a coherent policy because there is a greater need for a
neutral forum to resolve these types of suits than there is to resolve suits by individuals against the states. He also justified
Fitzpatrick's exception because the Fourteenth Amendment is sui generis, specifically targets the states, and provides only
limited abrogation.225
In contrast, if abrogation were extended to Interstate Commerce Clause statutes, it would apply to all of Congress' Article I
powers. The dissent viewed this result as unreasonable.226 “If Hans means only that federal-question suits for money damages
against the States cannot be brought in *562  federal court unless Congress clearly says so, it means nothing at all.”227 Justice
Scalia acknowledged that Congress' power, under Parden, to require that states waive immunity as a condition of participating
in activity regulated under the Commerce Clause was essentially the same as abrogation. He argued, however, that this aspect of
Parden should be overruled.228 He did not, however, clearly distinguish his comfort at overruling Parden from his discomfort
at overruling Hans.
As a matter of immunity theory, Union Gas is troubling because the separate opinions of Justices Brennan, Stevens and Scalia
reveal three markedly different views of the source, scope and nature of states' immunity from suits filed in federal court.
Moreover, as a practical matter, Union Gas rests upon a shaky plurality that could collapse with the addition of a single new
justice. Four justices embraced the plurality's reasoning; four justices embraced the dissent's rationale.229
B. Abrogation Under The Bankruptcy Code
After Union Gas, two questions arose in bankruptcy cases.230 First, does the Bankruptcy Clause grant Congress the same power
to abrogate states' immunity as the Fourteenth Amendment (Fitzpatrick) and the Interstate Commerce Clause (Union Gas)?
Second, if so, has Congress unequivocally abrogated states' immunity from suit for federal question causes of action that arise
under the Bankruptcy Code?
1. Abrogation under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
Under the 1978 version of section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress waived the federal government's immunity and
abrogated the states' immunity with respect to a broad array of issues that arise in bankruptcy cases:
Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section231 and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity—
*563  (1) a provision of this title [i.e., title 11, the Bankruptcy Code] that contains “creditor,” “entity,” or “governmental unit”
applies to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a provision binds governmental units.232
The terms “creditor” “entity” and “governmental unit” appeared in sections of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with federal
bankruptcy law causes of action that arise under the Bankruptcy Code and with administrative determinations that arise in a
bankruptcy case.233 Although the legislative history suggests that Congress had no power to waive states' sovereign immunity
“completely,”234 section 106(c) was clearly designed to bind states to bankruptcy court orders even if the states did not
voluntarily participate in the bankruptcy case.235
The abrogation clause was tested in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance236 (in 1989, the same year
as Union Gas). In Hoffman, the bankruptcy trustee had sued a state agency to recover preferential tax payments and to compel
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the turnover of monies due under a Medicaid *564  contract. The Court, in yet another plurality decision, held that section
106(c) had not effectively abrogated states' immunity.237
Justice White, in an opinion joined by three of the four justices who had dissented in Union Gas,238 held that section 106(c) does
not reflect a clear congressional intent to abrogate state's immunity with respect to the recovery of monetary damages.239 The
fourth Union Gas dissenter, Justice Scalia, filed a concurring opinion (which one member of the plurality also joined).240 The
plurality opinion did not consider whether Congress had authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate states' immunity.
The concurrence, however, would have held that Congress has no power under the Bankruptcy Clause or the Interstate
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity, and would have overruled Union Gas.241 Two additional Hoffman plurality
justices had earlier joined Justice Scalia's Union Gas dissent, which would have held that Congress had no power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate immunity.242
The four Hoffman dissenters argued that section 106(c) unequivocally abrogated states' immunity.243 These four justices (all
of whom had joined the plurality opinion in Union Gas) also would have held that Congress had power under the Bankruptcy
Clause to abrogate states' immunity.244
Three years later, the Court considered whether section 106(c) evinced a waiver by the federal government of its immunity
from suit. In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,245 the trustee had sued the Internal Revenue Service to recover federal
tax payments made by a corporate officer who had *565  improperly used corporate chapter 11 funds to pay a personal tax
liability.246 Because Nordic Village involved a suit against the United States, it raised only a federal government waiver issue.
It did not implicate either the Eleventh Amendment or abrogation of states' immunity. The case is interesting, however, because
it shows how the interpretation of section 106(c) shifted as new justices joined the Court. The Hoffman justices split five-to-
four on whether section 106(c) clearly abrogated states' immunity. The Nordic Village justices split seven-to-two on essentially
the same question in the context of federal government immunity.
The Court held that section 106(c) does not “unequivocally express” a waiver of the federal government's immunity from
suit.247 The majority comprised the five-justice plurality from Hoffman (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy), plus both of the new justices (Justices Souter and Thomas).248 Justice Stevens again dissented, joined
by Justice Blackmun.249
Although the two Hoffman concurring justices would have held that Congress has no authority to abrogate states' immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress could not resolve this issue by legislation. Congress could, however, easily respond
to the five justices who concluded in Hoffman that the Bankruptcy Code did not contain an unequivocal abrogation of states'
immunity (and the seven justices who concluded in Nordic Village that the Bankruptcy Code did not contain an unequivocal
waiver of the federal government's immunity).
2. Abrogation under the 1994 Bankruptcy Code Amendments
In 1994, Congress amended the abrogation section of the Bankruptcy *566  Code, in response to Hoffman and Nordic
Village.250 Under the new provision:251
Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit252 to the extent
set forth in this section253 with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544,
545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142,
1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this title.254
This provision abrogates state governmental immunity and waives federal governmental immunity with respect to a broad
array of federal bankruptcy law actions that “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code or “arise in” a bankruptcy case, including:
matters relating to the general administration of the bankruptcy estate and the bankruptcy case,255 and actions to (i) avoid *567
transfers of property to the state and recover property from the state,256 (ii) enjoin action by the state that might be detrimental
to the bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy estate, or the debtor,257 (iii) bind the state with respect to the debtor's discharge and/
or plan confirmation and with respect to the effects of discharge and confirmation,258 (iv) determine the amount, priority and
distribution on the state's claims,259 including secured claims,260 (v) determine tax claims and implement special provisions
concerning tax consequences,261 (vi) assume, reject and assign leases and executory contracts,262 and (vii) collect property
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of the estate and determine exemptions.263 As to all of these actions, *568  the 1994 Amendments abrogate states' immunity
even if the government has not filed a claim.264
The amended provision seems to abrogate states' immunity unequivocally and in “unmistakably clear language,”265 in
compliance with the first prong of Fitzpatrick.266 The legislative history expressly states that the amendment is intended to
overrule Hoffman and Nordic Village.267
Under Fitzpatrick's second prong, abrogation is constitutionally permissible only if it is enacted pursuant to a valid exercise
of congressional power.268 One circuit court of appeals and several bankruptcy courts soon held that abrogation under the
1994 Amendments was valid and constitutional.269 Each of these courts expressly extended Union Gas's reasoning from the
Interstate Commerce Clause to the Bankruptcy Clause, as the four dissenters in Hoffman would have done.270
By 1996, however, the Court's composition had changed significantly. Justice White, who had provided the swing vote during
the 1989 Court Term, had left the Court. He had held that neither CERCLA (Union Gas concurrence *569  271) nor the
1978 version of the Bankruptcy Code (Hoffman plurality272) provided a clear abrogation of states' immunity. He equivocated,
however, on the authority question: in Union Gas, he agreed that Congress has abrogation authority under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, but he declined to join the plurality's reasoning.273 In Hoffman, he declined to address the question.274
During that Term, the other eight justices split on the authority question. Four justices argued that Congress has no abrogation
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause (Union Gas dissent275); and two of these justices argued that Congress has no
abrogation authority under the Bankruptcy Clause (Hoffman concurrence276). All four of these justices remained on the Court
in 1996 and remain on the Court today.277 The other four justices argued that Congress has abrogation authority under both the
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause (Union Gas plurality and Hoffman dissent).278 Of these four justices,
only Justice Stevens remained on the Court in 1996 and remains on the Court today.
Consequently, Union Gas was in danger of being overruled if any of the four new, uncommitted, justices279 joined the four
Union Gas dissenters. That is exactly what happened in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,280 when the Court once again
considered the scope of congressional authority to abrogate states' immunity. In yet another five-to-four decision, Seminole
expressly overruled Union Gas, only seven years after Union Gas had been decided. Even though three of the four new justices
agreed with the Union Gas plurality's holding that Congress has broad authority to abrogate states' immunity,281 the fourth new
justice joined the Union Gas dissenters.282
The scorecard reflects that eight of the last thirteen justices interpret the *570  Constitution as permitting Congress to abrogate
states' immunity under Congress' enumerated powers, including the Interstate Commerce Clause.283 This interpretation is also
consistent with the view accepted by most constitutional law scholars.284 In contrast, only five of the last thirteen justices have
voted to limit abrogation to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. This five-justice “minority” now holds the majority
position on the Court.285
C. The Seminole Case: Jurisdictional Immunity
In Seminole, a Florida Indian tribe286 sued the state of Florida in federal court to enforce a federal statute that had been enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.287 The statute, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),288 requires that states
negotiate with Indian tribes in certain circumstances to achieve compacts with respect to gaming on tribal lands.289 IGRA
clearly authorizes Indian tribes to sue states for non-compliance.290 It also provides that “[t]he United States district courts
shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into
negotiations ... or to conduct such negotiations in good faith ....”291
All nine justices agreed that these provisions contain clear and unequivocal language evincing a congressional intent to abrogate
states' immunity *571  from suits filed in federal court to enforce IGRA.292 The five-justice majority, however, held that
Congress does not have authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.293
The dissenters bitterly criticized each prong of the majority's reasoning.294 Once again, the disputes focussed on the source,
scope and nature of states' federal court immunity.
First, as to the source of immunity, Seminole held that the Eleventh Amendment itself, rather than some generalized
constitutional or extra-constitutional common law principle, provides the basis of states' immunity from suit in federal court.295
Second, as to scope, the majority concluded that the Eleventh Amendment applies to both diversity and federal question actions
filed in federal court, including actions filed by citizens (or by Indian tribes) against their own states.296 The Court acknowledged
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that the words of the Eleventh Amendment did not apply, but stated that “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions
are postulates which limit and control.”297 Those postulates, according to the Court, included immunity in same-state citizen
federal question cases. The Court added that it was bound to follow Hans which, it concluded, had relied upon the Eleventh
Amendment (supplemented by such a postulate) as the basis of states' federal question immunity.298 By this reasoning, the
majority essentially adopted the “expansive” interpretation of Hans.299
Justice Souter, in dissent, argued that the Eleventh Amendment applies only to diversity jurisdiction cases filed against a state by
a citizen of another state.300 States may be immune from federal question suits filed in federal court by the state's own citizens
or another state's citizens; however, immunity in federal question cases arises solely from non-constitutional common *572
law.301 Justice Souter's rationale clearly embraces the “diversity” interpretation and departs from the more flexible rationale
employed by the Union Gas plurality (i.e., even if federal question immunity is a constitutional doctrine, Congress can abrogate
immunity).302 Similarly, Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that states' immunity in federal question cases arises solely from
federal common law.303
Third, because the Seminole majority applied the Eleventh Amendment (rather than common law immunity) to same-state
citizen federal question suits, the majority was required to define the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court
concluded, with little analysis, that the Eleventh Amendment limits federal courts' Article III “judicial power.”304 Consequently,
federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear suits that are within the Amendment's scope.
Finally, the Court reasoned that the Constitution can be modified only by constitutional amendment, not by legislative action.
Consequently, Congress cannot “abrogate” the jurisdictional limit that the Eleventh Amendment imposes on federal courts'
power.305 IGRA's abrogation provision, therefore, is unconstitutional.
The Court applied this holding directly to abrogation under statutes enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.306 By
overruling Union Gas, the Court extended this holding to abrogation under statutes enacted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause.307 Seminole's reasoning also extends indirectly to the Bankruptcy Clause.308
Although Seminole's interpretation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as *573  a jurisdictional bar arguably is consistent with
the Amendment's language,309 Seminole's holding goes significantly beyond any precedent interpreting the Amendment.310
The Court insisted that it was following Hans.311 Hans, however, clearly did not compel this result.312
First, abrogation was not an issue in Hans. The Court in Hans considered only whether a state enjoyed some form of immunity
in a same-state citizen, federal question suit filed in federal court. It never considered whether *574  Congress could abrogate
that immunity.313 Hans did not even precisely define the source of states' federal question immunity, let alone its nature.314
Indeed, Hans could not have considered whether Congress had power to abrogate states' immunity, because the issue in Hans
arose directly under the Contract Clause rather than under a statute that purported to abrogate states' immunity.315 In contrast,
Seminole and Union Gas involved statutes under which Congress manifested a clear attempt to abrogate states' immunity.
Second, earlier cases that interpret the Eleventh Amendment as having jurisdictional aspects do so only in the context of either
the court's ability to raise the immunity issue sua sponte or the state's ability to raise the immunity defense for the first time on
appeal.316 No prior decision has interpreted the Amendment's jurisdictional bar as expansively as Seminole.
Despite holding that Congress generally may not modify the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, the Court reaffirmed
Fitzpatrick (which had permitted Congress to use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate states' immunity).317
The Seminole majority reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment had essentially “amended” or “modified” the Eleventh
Amendment's jurisdictional bar.318 Consequently, the majority suggested that only the Fourteenth Amendment granted
Congress power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.319
The manner in which the majority distinguishes Congress' Fourteenth *575  Amendment powers from Congress' other
enumerated powers in the context of abrogation is troubling. First, the Court suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment uniquely
expands (or grants Congress the power to expand) federal courts' Article III powers despite the Eleventh Amendment's limitation
of those powers. This interpretation strains the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
even mention Article III, federal courts' “judicial powers,” sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, abrogation, or suits
in federal court, let alone expressly grant Congress any particular powers with respect to abrogating immunity or subjecting
states to suit in federal court. Although the Fourteenth Amendment contains a broad, general enabling clause, that clause mirrors
Article I's enabling clause.320 There is little to suggest that only the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress abrogation powers
but the enumerated powers do not. Although the text of the Fourteenth Amendment refers directly to the states, Congress also
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has the power to bind the states to federal laws enacted under Congress' other enumerated powers (within the limitations of
the Tenth Amendment).
Second, the Court's carefully constructed vision of a Fourteenth Amendment designed to modify the Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional bar with respect to federal question suits is suspect because the Eleventh Amendment was not interpreted to extend
to federal question cases until after the Fourteenth Amendment had been enacted.321
Third, even if the Eleventh Amendment applies to federal question suits and imposes a jurisdictional bar, the Court fails to
explain adequately why Justice Brennan's reconciliation of abrogation (in the Union Gas plurality) is flawed. If the explanation
is simply that Congress cannot modify a jurisdictional bar, then the majority fails to explain adequately why Congress can
abrogate that bar under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fourth, denying Congress the ability to supervise states' regulation of  *576  Indian affairs seems inconsistent with Congress'
exclusive regulatory power over Indian affairs.322
Part III.D considers Seminole's immediate impact on abrogation.
D. Abrogation after Seminole
After issuing its decision in Seminole, the Supreme Court remanded four pending cases in which various Indian tribes had sued
states or state officials under IGRA.323 On remand, the appellate courts dismissed each of these cases for lack of jurisdiction,
based upon Seminole.324 The Court also vacated and remanded cases in which citizens had sued states under the Copyright
Act,325 the Fair Labor Standards Act,326 and the Bankruptcy Code.327 In other *577  cases seeking remedies under a variety
of federal statutes, the courts quickly held that Article I gave Congress no abrogation powers.328 The only significant *579
exception occurred in a case in which one circuit court of appeals upheld congressional abrogation under the War Powers
Clause.329 Two district courts have, however, rejected that court's reasoning.330
What are Seminole's implications in bankruptcy cases? Is the Bankruptcy Code's abrogation provision unconstitutional? Does
the Eleventh Amendment apply in bankruptcy court? Are bankruptcy actions “suits” for Eleventh Amendment purposes? Can
Congress use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate states' immunity in bankruptcy cases? Can the estate sue a state in
bankruptcy court with the state's consent? Can the estate sue a state in state court without the state's consent to enforce federal
bankruptcy law? Might Supreme Court review, suits against state officials, or *580  suits by the federal government provide
adequate means of enforcing the Bankruptcy Code against recalcitrant states? These questions are considered in the second
article of this two-part series.
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was adopted in reaction to Chisholm); discussion infra at notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
60 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment did not grant states immunity in
all federal court cases) (“Had Congress desired to enshrine state sovereign immunity in federal courts for all cases, for instance, it
could easily have adopted the first resolution introduced on February 19, 1793, in the House.”).
61 See supra note 59, infra notes 117-118.
62 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 See discussion infra at notes 200-202.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
65 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., sources cited infra at notes 87, 91, 97 and 109.
67 See discussion infra at Parts III.C (immunity), III.D (abrogation), IV.B.1 (waiver and consent), IV.B.2 (federal question cases filed
in state court).
68 Cf. discussion infra at 632-633 concerning the scope of traditional immunity.
69 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 21227 (1997);
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445-49 (1900).
70 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 785, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1991)
(suit by United States); U. S. v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140, 85 S. Ct. 808, 13 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1965) (same); State of South Dakota
v. State of North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 24 S. Ct. 269, 48 L. Ed. 448 (1904) (suit by state); U.S. v. State of Tex., 143 U.S. 621,
12 S. Ct. 488, 36 L. Ed. 285 (1892) (suit by United States).
71 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). After the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, the Court dismissed
the Hollingsworth case, which had been pending in federal court apparently based solely on diversity jurisdiction.
72 See supra notes 53, 59.
73 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
74 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The congruence of language suggests
that the Amendment was intended simply to adopt the narrow view of the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; henceforth,
a State could not be sued in federal court where the basis of jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen of another state or an
alien.”); Amar, supra note 53, at 1475, 1481; Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 495 (1989) (noting that, under the diversity view of the Eleventh Amendment (see infra notes
107-127 and accompanying text), the citizen-state and foreign citizen-state language “reads virtually in haec verba with that of the
state-diversity clauses of the jurisdictional menu precisely because these and only these categories were meant to be repealed”).
75 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
76 U.S. CONST. Amend. XI.
77 Although the Amendment actually refers only to a suit by “citizens,” and an earlier version of the Amendment, which was not
adopted, would have expressly applied to a suit by a “person” or “persons,” courts have not distinguished between “a citizen” and
“citizens” under the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 59.
78 See generally discussion infra at notes 91-123 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20974 (1989) (overruled by, Seminole Tribe
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of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996)); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S. Ct. 423, 88 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1985);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890); cf.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976).
80 See, e.g., Seminole, 517 U.S. 44 (majority opinion); see also Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v.
Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA)
1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 32876 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
81 See, e.g., Seminole, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L.
Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C.
2113 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun).
82 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, is a good example of this tactic. See discussion infra at text
accompanying notes 182-208, see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 19 (suggesting that Justice Brennan may have suppressed his views in Union Gas to avoid losing Justice White's vote).
83 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890).
84 By the time Hans arose, Congress had enacted a statute that granted federal courts general federal question jurisdiction. See supra
note 58.
85 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....”).
86 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1-3.
87 Id. at 9-10, 20. Several scholars have argued that the case did not really raise a federal question, but they generally agree that Hans
must be viewed as a federal question case because the Court treated it that way. See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2242 n.132
(suggesting that the cause of action was really under state law, but that the Court treated it as a federal law question); Meltzer, supra
note 82, at 8 & n.38 (suggesting that Hans “might be viewed as falling within federal question jurisdiction”); but cf. William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1055 n.97 (1983) (arguing that Hans was not a federal
question case); William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 931, 941-48 (1989-1990) (arguing that Hans merely applied common law immunity to bar a common law contract claim, and
that Hans, therefore, does not give rise to any type of immunity that would apply to claims under the Constitution or federal law).
88 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
89 Id. at 12.
90 “Hans-type” immunity refers to the source and scope of states' immunity from same-state citizen suits in federal court to enforce
federal law. Professor Hovenkamp also identifies four interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment after Hans, as follows: (i) the
Eleventh Amendment bars diversity actions by citizens of one state against another state; (ii) the Eleventh Amendment and its
“penumbra” bar diversity and federal question actions by citizens of one state against another state, unless Congress abrogates; (iii)
the Eleventh Amendment and its “penumbra” bar diversity and federal question actions by any citizens against any state, including
their own state, unless Congress abrogates; (iv) the Eleventh Amendment and its “penumbra” bar diversity and federal question
actions by any citizens against any state, including their own state, and Congress may not abrogate. Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at
2239. The “penumbrae” are necessary because the Amendment's language does not include the broader meanings. See id. at 2242.
Professor Hovenkamp argues that the historical meaning is the first meaning, and that the Amendment was designed to preserve
traditional common law immunity as a limit on federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 2239-41. He suggests that Hans adopted
the third meaning, but did not address the abrogation issues (which distinguish the second and third from the fourth meanings).
See id. at 2242. These categories parallel the first three categories discussed in the text (in reverse order), except that Professor
Hovenkamp adds the abrogation issue. To avoid mixing distinct issues, I defer discussion of abrogation until Part III, infra. Professor
Hovenkamp's categories also do not expressly include the fourth category discussed in the text, which sets forth Professor Field's
argument that both diversity and federal question immunity are common law doctrines that are merely preserved by the Amendment.
This suggestion is significant because it questions whether immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and under the common law
should be treated as being different in nature, for purposes of considering issues such as waiver and abrogation. See discussion infra
at Part IV.B.1; see also Field, supra note 13, at 540 nn.88-89 (discussing varied interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment).
91 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1988)
(noting that the Eleventh Amendment “has been construed to embody or recognize a broad constitutional immunity for states from
being sued in federal courts”); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
61, 62-63 (1989) (describing this as the conventional interpretation, but noting that it is highly criticized by scholars); Meltzer,
supra note 82, at 9-10 (concluding that, after Hans, the Eleventh Amendment was seen as restoring immunity far broader than
its text); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,“ 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 105-06 (1996) (suggesting that
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART ONE], 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 521
 © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 22
Hans applied the Eleventh Amendment to suits in federal court by citizens of other states to enforce federal causes of action, then
extended it to suits by citizens of the same state as well); Field, supra note 13, at 522-23 (noting that one view of Hans is that “all
state sovereign immunity derives from the eleventh amendment, despite the amendment's wording indicating its applicability only
to suits ‘commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.”’).
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
93 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11; cf. note 97 infra (identifying scholars who suggest possible explanations for the distinction between citizen
suits and non-citizen suits).
94 Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-15.
95 See, e.g., Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411
U.S. 279, 291-92, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) P 32876 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring):
[I]t has become established by repeated decisions of this Court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its
own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.
Id. (quoting Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 662 (1974); Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322, 54 S. Ct. 745, 78 L. Ed. 1282 (1934) (“Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”); id. at 322-23 (reasoning that these postulates
include immunity for states sued in federal court except where that immunity was surrendered in the plan of the convention) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. v. State of Tex., 143 U.S. 621, 644, 12 S. Ct. 488, 36 L. Ed. 285 (1892).
96 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199,
42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996) (majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas) (discussed infra at Part III.C.); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20974 (1989) (overruled by, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996)) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 For explanations of why the drafters might have wished to prohibit suits by citizens of other states but allow suits by citizens of the
same state, see generally Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989);
Massey, supra note 91; MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER, 192-93 (2d ed. 1990); see also Gene R. Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601, 609 (1989); cf.
Amar, supra note 74, at 494-98 (criticizing Professor Marshall's intepretation); discussion infra at 112-116 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 97, at 1347; Shreve, supra note 97, at 611-12.
99 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 6 S. Ct. 608, 29 L. Ed. 805
(1886); State of Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 2 S. Ct. 128, 27 L. Ed. 448 (1883)).
100 See Ayers, 123 U.S. at 515; Hagood, 117 U.S. at 71; Jumel, 107 U.S. at 728.
101 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 82, at 8-9 (arguing that the cases Hans cites “were at best implicit, however, and the Court did not give
the point the attention it deserves”).
102 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
103 Id. (emphasis added); cf. id. at 18 (stating additional reasons for dismissing the suit).
104 Id. at 18.
105 See sources cited supra note 97; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D.
Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687-88, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that suit by a citizen of
another state is barred under constitutional immunity, but that suit by the state's own citizen is barred only under a non-constitutional
immunity and is, therefore, subject to congressional abrogation); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v.
Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 313-15, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas.
(BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 32876 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); but cf. Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20974 (1989)
(overruled by, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d
(MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996)) (Brennan, J.) (apparently not focussing
on the distinction between citizen and non-citizen federal question suits); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp.,
483 U.S. 468, 509, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment only applies to diversity suits); see also Field, supra note 13, at 539-40 & n.88; Meltzer, supra note 82, at 16-17.
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106 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42
Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996); Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1; Welch, 483 U.S. 468; Atascadero,
473 U.S. 234; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976); Edelman, 415 U.S. 651; Employees, 411 U.S. 279;
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 12 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964) (overruled by, Welch
v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987)); Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890); see also Field, supra note 19, at 5 (“Most of the important cases since
1890 involved suits against a state by its own citizens ....”). The distinction becomes particularly significant in determining whether
Congress can abrogate states' immunity. See discussion infra at Part III.
107 See, e.g., Welch, 483 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun) (arguing that the
Eleventh Amendment only applies to diversity suits).
108 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); id. at 93-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that sovereign immunity has nothing to do with the Eleventh Amendment); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23-24 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Hans obfuscated the distinction between sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment); Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 304, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74-81, 106 S. Ct. 423, 88 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1985).
109 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 53 at 1466-1473; Amar, supra note 74, at 494-98 (discussing the diversity view in the context of
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment); Alan D. Cullision, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White
Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1967); RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELZTER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1052-1055 (4th ed. 1996); William A.
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1262-64, 1274 (1989);
Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1035-36; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Jackson, supra note 91; Meltzer, supra note 82, at 10-13 (discussing the diversity view and
arguing that it is the better interpretation); John V. Orth, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 39, 149 (1987).
110 See supra notes 93-96, 103; see also Field, supra note 87.
111 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 53, at 1476, Melzter, supra note 82, at 12-13; Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare
Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260 (1990).
112 The federal courts' judicial power under Article III clearly extends to federal question suits. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See
Amar, supra note 53, at 1480-83.
113 See supra note 74 and accompanying text; Amar, supra note 74, at 489-90. In the context of diversity jurisdiction, the Amendment's
reference only to suits against a state by citizens of another state is understandable — there is no need to limit federal courts'
jurisdiction over a diversity suit against a state by the state's own citizens because diversity jurisdiction does not extend to such a
suit. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
114 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 53, at 1475, 1481-82; Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1035-36, 1055-62.
115 See generally sources cited supra note 109; see, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1036; Fletcher, supra note 109, at 1291; see also
Union Gas, 491 at 7 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116 See sources cited supra note 109.
117 See discussion supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. The earlier proposal, which would have applied to federal question suits,
read:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established
under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner of foreigners,
of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.
PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 861 (2d
ed. 1994); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA)
758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hovenkamp, supra
note 13, at 2240-41 (arguing that the earlier proposal would have applied to federal question cases); Fletcher, supra note 109, at
1269 (arguing that the earlier proposal “would have flatly prohibited a state from being made a defendant in a suit brought by a
private individual”).
118 For example, if the Amendment had been meant to apply only to diversity jurisdiction, it might have read:
The Judicial power of the United States with respect to Controversies between a State and Citizens of another State or between a
State and foreign Citizens or Subjects shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The emphasized language shows the change from the Amendment as enacted. The drafters might simply have viewed such a
construction as awkward or redundant.
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART ONE], 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 521
 © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24
119 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 53, at 1473, 1481; Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2238-41; Field, supra note 13 at 537-38; Fletcher,
supra note 87, at 1063; Fletcher, supra note 109, at 1264-75.
120 See infra note 123, Amar, supra note 53 at 1482; Fletcher, supra note 110, at 1263-64, 1274-75.
Justice Rehnquist has argued that the drafters did not discuss federal question jurisdiction because, at the time the Amendment
was ratified, the lower federal courts did not exercise general jurisdiction over federal question actions. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at
69-70 (Rehnquist, J.) (referring to The Judiciary Act of 1875, which granted federal courts general federal question jurisdiction).
Consequently, because the drafters never expected that federal courts would have jurisdiction over federal question actions, they did
not foresee the need to extend the Amendment to such actions. Justice Souter has rejected this argument because, even though the
lower federal courts did not exercise general federal question jurisdiction at the time of the Amendment, the drafters were aware that
the lower federal courts might be granted general federal question powers in the future. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 116 n.12 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting that laws enacted between 1790 to 1801 demonstrate that “early Congresses exercised their authority pursuant
to Article III to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to resolve various matters of federal law” and arguing that even though
some of these acts were repealed, they still demonstrate that early Congresses recognized “the potential scope of Article III”); see
also Meltzer, supra note 82, at 20 (noting other weaknesses in Justice Rehnquist's reasoning); Fletcher, supra note 109, at 1274-75.
121 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 101 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that there was no discussion of federal question and concluding from
this silence that no one thought states were immune from federal question suits at the time).
122 See Amar, supra note 53, at 1481-84; Fletcher, supra note 109, at 1276-79, 1291-93; Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2240-41.
123 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 82, at 11 (arguing that the diversity view preserves the full reach of federal courts' power to enforce federal
law and, thereby, makes the federal judicial and legislative powers co-extensive).
124 See Field supra note 13; Field supra note 19, at 7-8 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment merely restored Justice Iredell's view,
which is that common law sovereign immunity was undisturbed by the Constitution and that Congress can abrogate immunity).
125 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-19, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890); Field, supra note 13, at 527-546 (arguing that Article
III does not eliminate pre-existing traditional common law immunity or impose immunity as a constitutional requirement; rather,
it is neutral; it simply restores the prior understanding, reflected in Justice Iredell's opinion in Hans, that common law immunity
survived the enactment of Article III); see also Burnham, supra note 87, at 934-40.
126 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-19; see also Field, supra note 13, at 537 (arguing that Hans is consistent with the view that sovereign
immunity survived Article III only as a common law doctrine). Professor Field has also argued that courts interpret Hans as
expanding the Eleventh Amendment based on underlying postulates which limit and control:
One oddity of this interpretational approach is that the Court is essentially saying the rule would be the same if the Eleventh
Amendment were not there. The redundancy is not because the Amendment is unimportant, but because the principle it reflects lies
at the root of the constitutional system.
Field, supra note 19, at 5-6 (footnote omitted). Professor Field argues that reading this into the Amendment “quite evidently flies in
the face of the language of the Eleventh Amendment itself.” Id. at 6. She nevertheless acknowledges that the courts have interpreted
Hans as applying the Eleventh Amendment, rather than the common law, to suits by citizens against their own states. See id.
127 See Field supra note 13, at 541-43 (arguing that, if the Eleventh Amendment is designed to adopt Justice Iredell's view, then it
embodies common law immunity because Justice Iredell simply said that Article III did not eliminate common law immunity; suits
against states are beyond the scope of federal courts' Article III powers only in the sense that Article III does not require such suits
to be heard in federal court, not in the sense that it does not permit them to be heard there with consent).
128 See Field, supra note 13, at 517-18. Professor Field also notes that the federal government enjoys immunity without an express grant
in the Constitution. If the Eleventh Amendment were necessary to grant states immunity, then what would be the basis for federal
government immunity? She concludes that both arise from the common law. Id. at 544.
129 See Meltzer, supra note 82, at 17 (arguing that Professor Field's view that all federal court immunity arises under the common law
goes too far; among other problems, it cannot explain the Eleventh Amendment's distinction between citizen and non-citizen suits).
130 See Field, supra note 13, at 544.
131 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. The decision also reflects greater concern for defining the scope of states' immunity (i.e., whether or not
it applies to same-state citizen suits), than for determining its source (i.e., common law versus the Eleventh Amendment).
132 Id. at 21.
133 Other issues that turn on the distinction between common law and constitutional immunity include whether the state may waive
“immunity” (discussed infra at Part IV.B.1), and whether federal courts may review a state court determination of federal law
involving a state (discussed infra at Part IV.B.3).
134 These two decades began in 1976, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976), and ended in 1996, see Seminole
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Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996).
135 In contrast, certain other enforcement alternatives apply only in limited circumstances. See discussion infra at Part IV.B.3-5.
136 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 87, at 934-35 & n.11; Meltzer, supra note 82, at 19 (“[A]ny position that reads Article III and/or the
Eleventh Amendment as recognizing state sovereign immunity but that affirms Congress' power to overcome that immunity faces
grave difficulties;” arguing that the diversity view of the Eleventh Amendment obviates these problems); see also Field supra note
13, at 538-39 (arguing that Justice Brennan interprets the Eleventh Amendment as creating sovereign immunity as a constitutional
requirment but only with respect to matters within its literal scope, which does not include suits by states' own citizens); id. at
515 (arguing that Justice Brennan would allow congressional abrogation and state waiver in suits by states' own citizens because
sovereign immunity is only a common law doctrine, not constitutionally required, in such cases). For a comprehensive analysis of
the competing approaches to abrogation, see Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978) (concluding that the Constitution allows
sovereign immunity, but does not impose it as a constitutional doctrine); id. at 1212 (“If sovereign immunity has constitutional
status, how could Congress abrogate it?”); see also Field, supra note 19, at 6-7 (characterizing the question as “whether sovereign
immunity for states in federal court ... is constitutionally required;” in other words, can Congress abrogate states' immunity or is it
a constitutional right); Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2239-42 (discussed supra at note 90).
137 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2245 (arguing that the Constitution was enacted with the common law as a backdrop;
Congress has power to abrogate common law doctrines; therefore, the majority in Seminole had to make immunity a constitutional
principle in order to avoid abrogation); see also Field, supra note 13, at 536-38 (state sovereign immunity as a common law doctrine
remains intact unless Congress abrogates).
138 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. See generally Monaghan,
supra note 82, at 121 (arguing that even if a “postulate” exists under which states are immune from suit without their consent, it
carries no significance when Congress has clearly abrogated that immunity); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20974 (1989) (overruled by, Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996)); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445 (abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment);
discussion infra at notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
139 Congress' power to regulate the states is limited by the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
140 Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 12 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964) (overruled in part by,
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987)).
141 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. (1986).
142 Id. at §§ 51, 56; see Parden, 377 U.S. at 185-86.
143 See Parden, 377 U.S at 187-90.
144 Id. at 192.
145 Id. at 198 (White, J. dissenting) (joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart).
146 Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
147 Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279,
93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
P 32876 (1973).
148 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1994).
149 Id. §§ 206, 207, 216(b), 217; see Employees, 411 U.S. at 282-83.
150 411 U.S. at 285.
151 Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Stewart). Justice Brennan dissented, reasoning that the states had surrendered
their immunity to the extent that the Constitution granted Congress power to enact federal law. Id. at 298.
152 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974).
153 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1994); see Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672-74.
154 415 U.S. at 672-74.
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155 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672. In two dissents, Justices Douglas, Marshall and Blackmun would have held that Congress had intended
to create a private cause of action against the states and that the state had consented to suit in any event. See id. at 678 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would have held that the states surrendered their immunity to the
extent that the Constitution grants Congress power to enact federal laws. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 674.
157 Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987).
158 Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined. Id. Justice White
also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 495 (White, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id. at
496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 475.
160 Id. at 478.
161 See id. at 475 (reserving “without deciding or intimating a view” whether Congress could subject states to suit in federal court
without their consent other than under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not questioning Congress' authority under powers other than
the Fourteenth Amendment to require that states waive immunity); see also Field, supra note 136, at 1209 (noting that the only
opinion in Parden, Employees and Edelman that denied Congress power to abrogate states' immunity was Justice Marshall's dissent
in Employees).
162 The (subsequently overruled) majority in Parden noted that states' immunity did not arise under the express language of the Eleventh
Amendment, but did not clearly state whether immunity was constitutionally required. Parden, 377 U.S. at 186. The dissent (which
would have allowed abrogation with a clear statement) viewed immunity as constitutionally required, but also seemed to suggest that
it was not within the express scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 198-200 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, the majority and
concurrence in Employees and the majority in Edelman suggested that immunity was constitutionally required, although not under
the express language of the Eleventh Amendment. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 280, 287; id. at 291-92 (Marshall, J. concurring);
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63, 678. It was not until Welch that the Court, by a plurality, expressly stated that the Eleventh Amendment
itself (rather than the common law or some general constitutional principle) barred same-state citizen suits. Welch, 483 U.S. at
487. Justice Brennan (dissenting in Employees and Edelman), joined by three other justices (dissenting in Welch), argued that only
common law immunity, rather than the Eleventh Amendment, applied because the cases involved citizen suits against their own
states to enforce federal law. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 309-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 687-88 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Welch, 483 U.S. at 497, 504-516 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Field, supra note 136, at 1210-1218 (contrasting
views of Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan and the Court concerning congressional power to condition states' participation in federal
programs on a waiver of immunity).
163 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976).
164 Id.
165 Bitzer was the Chairman of the Connecticut State Employees' Retirement Commission. The other defendants included Connecticut's
Treasurer and Comptroller. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 449 n.4.
166 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1994).
167 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. The plaintiffs sought money damages, in the form of retroactive benefits and attorney's fees. Id. at
449-50. Because the plaintiffs sought money damages, rather than simply injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(discussed infra at Part IV.B.4) did not apply.
168 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2002e-2(a, b, f), 2000e-5(a-g); see Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 449 & n.2.
169 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456-57.
170 Id. at 456-57.
171 Id. at 452-56; see also Field, supra note 19, at 10-11 (characterizing Fitzpatrick's “curious” emphasis on the Fourteenth Amendment
as a departure from established abrogation law in cases such as Parden and Employees, under which the Court suggested that
Congress could abrogate states' immunity under any of Congress' legislative powers).
172 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55.
173 See id. at 452-56; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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174 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (emphasis added).
175 Id. § 5.
176 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
177 Id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, concurring separately, does not expressly disagree with Justice Brennan,
but argues that “[e]ven if the Eleventh Amendment does cover a citizen's suit against his own State, it does not bar an action against
state officers enforcing an invalid statute.” Id. at 458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
178 Id. at 457.
179 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S. Ct. 423, 88 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1985) (reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
a citizen suit against a state in federal court absent a state's consent or clear Congressional abrogation pursuant to a valid exercise
of power; dismissing suit in which AFDC recipients challenged state's method of calculating benefits).
180 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village,
501 U.S. 775, 786, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1991); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 105 L. Ed.
2d 181, 53 Ed. Law Rep. 792 (1989) (reasoning that abrogation must be in the text of the statute, legislative history is irrelevant
to this inquiry); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76, 26 Soc.
Sec. Rep. Serv. 175, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 514, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1204, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 72856 (1989)
(holding that the Bankruptcy Code did not contain clear language abrogating states' immunity); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways
and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987); Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59
L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979) (reasoning that the statute must “explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away
the immunity of the States ...”); Field, supra note 136, at 1235-37; cf. Field, supra note 19, at 10-11 (noting that the clear statement
requirement arose before Fitzpatrick in cases such as Employees; suggesting that Fitzpatrick might have eliminated this requirement
in the context of Fourteenth Amendment statutes because Fitzpatrick did not mention the need for a clear statement; acknowledging
however that later cases such as Atascadero required a clear statement in Fourteenth Amendment statutes as well).
181 See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234 (Rehabilitation Act did not abrogate immunity; state may but did not waive immunity);
Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (“§ 1362 does not reflect an ‘unmistakably clear’ intent to abrogate immunity”); Dellmuth, 491 U.S. 223
(holding that the Education of the Handicapped Act did not abrogate states' immunity because there was no unequivocal declaration
that Congress intended to exercise such powers); Hoffman, 492 U.S. 96 (Bankruptcy Code did not abrogate states' immunity);
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89 (“[W]e have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States”); Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity because the general language of the Act does not reflect an intent to do so); Welch, 483 U.S. 468
(holding that “congress has not expressed in unmistakable statutory language its intention to allow States to be sued under the Jones
Act”).
182 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
20974 (1989) (overruled by, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43952 (1996)).
183 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq. (1994).
184 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606.
185 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a).
186 Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
187 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (SARA § 101(20)(D)) (the exceptions relate to a state or local government unit that aquires ownership
or control involuntarily, such as through the bankruptcy or tax delinquency of the owner).
188 Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 4. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall joined this part of the
opinion. Id. These same three justices also agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion that Congress had authority to abrogate states'
immunity under a Commerce Clause statute. Id. Justice Scalia added the fifth vote by joining the part of Justice Brennans' opinion
that found a clear intent to abrogate. Id. at 29 (Scalia., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia dissented from
Justice Brennan's conclusion that Congress had authority to abrogate immunity. Id.
Justices White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy found no unmistakably clear abrogation. Id. at 45 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White, however, agreed with the four-justice plurality that Congress could abrogate immunity, although he disagreed with “much
of his [Brennan's] reasoning.” Id. at 57 (failing to explain the bases for his disagreement).
189 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7-13.
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190 See discussion supra notes 171-176 and accompanying text.
191 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16-17.
192 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20. “States enjoy no immunity where there has been ‘a surrender of this immunity in the plan of
convention.”’ Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23, 54 S. Ct.
745, 78 L. Ed. 1282 (1934) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 657 (Alexander Hamilton))).
193 Id. at 17-18.
194 See supra note 138 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 140-146, 157-160 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 140-160 and accompanying text. According to Union Gas, Parden and its progeny hold that Congress has power
under the Commerce Clause to override states' immunity, but Congress had not made its intent to override states' immunity clear
in the statute at issue in Employees. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14.
197 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (considering a federal criminal statute, under which a Virginia state judge had been arrested, that prohibited
state courts from excluding jurors based on race).
198 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-55, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18. Indeed, an implementing clause is required in a constitutional amendment only because the amendment
cannot take advantage of the implementing clauses contained in the Constitution itself.
200 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18; cf. Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 300, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 32876 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause of its surrender, no immunity exists that
can be the subject of a congressional declaration or a voluntary waiver.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687, 94 S. Ct. 1347,
39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Tribe has also advanced this interpretation of the Amemdment's “be
construed to” language. See Lawrence Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 652, 683-99 (1976); see also John C. Nowak, The Scope
of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and The History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); cf. Meltzer, supra note 82, at 18-19 (commenting that this argument is appealing
but finds little support in the constitutional text, history or structure).
201 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18-19; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 285, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1
A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22-23 (acknowledging that Congress has no power to expand federal courts' Article III powers, but
reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment does not implicate courts' Article III powers).
203 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890), discussed supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
204 The only applicable law in Hans was the Judiciary Act of 1875, which gave effect to Article III but did not expressly abrogate
immunity. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18-19.
205 Id. This approach arguably reconciles Chisholm as well. See Field, supra note 19, at 5 (in Chisholm, all five justices assumed that
Congress had power to subject states to suit in federal court; Justice Iredell dissented because he did not believe that Congress had
actually done so).
206 See also Field, supra note 19, at 8, 9 (arguing that Justice Brennan developed a coherent theory to support the long-established
practice of congressional abrogation of states' immunity in federal court, and that “Justice Brennan's theory ... made a lot more sense,
both historically and logically” than the theory advanced by Justice Douglas in Employees, but acknowledging that Justice Brennan's
theory never received more than four votes); but cf. Field, supra note 136, at 1256-58 (questioning why a self-executing constitutional
provision cannot abrogate states' immunity if a statute can; arguing that this might be justified if the Fourteenth Amendment is meant
to limit judicial power but not congressional power, but raising doubts concerning the viability of this interpretation).
207 In previous decisions, Justice Brennan consistently argued that immunity in federal question suits filed in a state's own citizens
arises only under the common law. In Fitzpatrick, for example, Justice Brennan, noting that the citizens were suing their own state,
suggested that:
[i]n that circumstance, Connecticut may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment, since that Amendment bars only federal-court suits
against States by citizens of other States. Rather, the question is whether Connecticut may avail itself of the nonconstitutional but
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity as a bar to a claim for damages under Title VII.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan argued that the answer was “no” because “[t]he States surrendered that immunity, in Hamilton's words, ‘in the plan
of the Convention,’ that formed the Union, at least insofar as the States granted Congress specifically enumerated powers.” Id. at
457-58 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed., 1876)). See also Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35329 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d
662 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 298-323, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) P 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 32876 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Union Gas, Justice Brennan carefully avoids any express statement of the source of states' immunity in same-state citizen federal
question suits. Justice Brennan's position in Union Gas may have been designed to avoid alienating Justice White, who provided the
fifth vote and who earlier had rejected Justice Brennan's common law argument. It may also have been designed to avoid a head-
to-head confrontation with the dissent, which argued that immunity was a constitutional doctrine. Justice White concurred in the
plurality's result, but declined without explanation to accept its reasoning. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring).
See also Field, supra note 19, at 7-10; Meltzer, supra note 82, at 14-15 (arguing that the Union Gas plurality's focus on abrogation
does not rely on the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but instead reasons from an extension of the Fitzpatrick
rationale and an argument that, under the Constitution, the states surrendered any immunity that would have prevented congressional
regulation).
208 517 U.S. 44 (1996), discussed infra at Part III.C.
209 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring); Seminole,
517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 24-25.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 26-28 & n.3.
215 Id. at 25-27.
216 Id. at 26; see also id. at 27 n.3 (commenting that this approach resolves the anomaly of federal court review of state court federal
question actions, which would not make sense if federal courts had no jurisdiction in federal question cases, as is suggested by those
who interpret Hans as extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to federal question cases).
217 Id. at 27.
218 Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined
the portion of Justice Scalia's opinion that addressed the abrogation issue.
219 Id. at 31. Justice Scalia focuses particularly on Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct.
2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987), in which the justices split four-to-four on whether to overrule Hans. In Union
Gas, Justice Scalia summarizes the competing positions advanced by the plurality and dissent in Welch.
220 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
221 Id. at 38.
222 Id. at 39.
223 See id. at 33 (citing U. S. v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 85 S. Ct. 808, 13 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1965); U.S. v. State of Tex., 143 U.S. 621,
12 S. Ct. 488, 36 L. Ed. 285 (1892)).
224 See id. (citing State of South Dakota v. State of North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 24 S. Ct. 269, 48 L. Ed. 448 (1904)).
225 As noted infra at note 319, these arguments would seem to apply to the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, XV.
226 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42.
227 Id. at 36.
228 Id. at 42; see also discussion supra at text accompanying notes 157-160 (noting that Welch overruled Parden in part).
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229 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5 (Brennan, J., for the plurality); id. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
discussion infra at notes 271-285 and accompanying text.
230 This discussion assumes that states' immunity extends to federal bankruptcy courts in the same manner as other federal courts. For
a discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV.A.1.
231 Former subsections 106(a) and 106(b) related to waiver and setoff. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 106(a), (b) (1978) (superseded). The current
provisions that replaced former subsections 106(a) and 106(b) are discussed infra at Part IV.B.1.a. For a history of § 106, see S.
Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 311, 315 n.31 (1995).
232 11 U.S.C § 106(c) (1978) (superseded).
233 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (providing an automatic stay applicable to all entities); 547(b) (permitting the recovery of preferential
transfers made to or for the benefit of a creditor); 1141 (stating that confirmation of a plan binds creditors).
234 “Congress does not ... have the power to waive sovereign immunity completely with respect to claims of [a] bankruptcy estate
against a State, though it may exercise its bankruptcy power through the supremacy clause to prevent or prohibit State action that is
contrary to bankruptcy policy.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 317; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 29-30 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6274 at 668.
235 “Section 106(c) codifies Gwilliam v. U. S., 519 F.2d 407, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9556, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) P 75-5168 (9th
Cir. 1975), and In re Dolard, 519 F.2d 282, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9558, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) P 75-5172 (9th Cir. 1975),
permitting the bankruptcy court to determine the amount and dischargeability of tax liabilities owing by the debtor or the estate prior
to or during a bankruptcy case whether or not the governmental unit to which such taxes are owed files a claim. Except as provided
in sections 106(a) and (b), subsection (c) is not limited to those issues, but permits the bankruptcy court to bind governmental units
on other matters as well. For example, section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title
11 against a governmental unit ...”
124 Cong. Rec. H. 11,091 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,407 (Oct. 6, 1978); see also Gibson, supra note 243, at 314-15 (suggesting that
the floor managers saw former section 106(c) as allowing the bankruptcy court to determine the amount and dischargeability of tax
claims even if the government had not filed a claim, and also to bind the government on other matters). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b),(c)
(1994 (allowing the debtor to assert counterclaims and setoff if the state has filed a claim).
236 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76, 26 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 175,
19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 514, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1204, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 72856 (1989) (five-to-four plurality).
237 Id. at 104.
238 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Justice White's plurality opinion. Id. at 96.
239 Id. at 101-02.
240 Id. at 105 (Scalia., J, concurring). Justice O'Connor, who had joined Justice White's plurality opinion, also joined Justice Scalia's
concurrence. Id.
241 Id. at 104 (White, J., for the plurality); id. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring).
242 These are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. See Union Gas, 491 U.S at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor).
243 Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, which Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun joined. See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
244 Id.
245 U.S. v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 112 S. Ct. 1011, 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1022, 26 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 9, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 74435B, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50109, 69 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) P 92-687 (1992).
246 Id. at 31. Chapter 11 is the part of the Bankruptcy Code under which businesses reorganize their financial affairs. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1144 (1994).
247 Id. at 31. Nordic Village required that waiver by the federal government be unambiguous and clearly stated in the text of the statute.
See id.
248 See id.
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249 See id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun had also joined Justice Marshall's and Justice Stevens' dissents in Hoffman.
See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The other two Hoffman dissenters
(Justices Brennan and Marshall) had since left the Court.
250 “This section would effectively overrule two Supreme Court cases that have held that the States and Federal Government are not
deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of enacting section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.”
[Discussing Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76, 26 Soc. Sec.
Rep. Serv. 175, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 514, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1204, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 72856 (1989) and
U.S. v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 112 S. Ct. 1011, 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1022, 26 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 9, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 74435B, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50109, 69 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) P 92-687 (1992).]
140 Cong. Rec. H. 10,794 (October 4, 1994). For a history of the 1994 Amendments to § 106, see Gibson, supra note 231, at 327-329.
251 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994). Former § 106(c) was redrafted as new § 106(a).
252 Governmental unit, as defined in Bankruptcy Code § 101(27), “means United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory;
municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentatlity of the United States, ... a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a
Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” Id. § 101(27).
253 The limitations are not significant for purposes of this analysis. Abrogation is limited under § 106(a)(3) (providing that a person may
not recover punitive damages against a governmental unit under § 106(a) abrogation, but may under § 106(c) waiver), § 106(a)(3)
(providing that the limitations of the Equal Access to Justice Act apply with respect to the recovery of fees and costs assessed against
a governmental unit), and § 106(a)(4) (requiring that the enforcement of judgments against a governmental unit must be consistent
with applicable non-bankruptcy law). See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3, 4) (1994); see also discussion infra at Part IV.B.1 (discussing waiver
and consent); see generally Gibson, supra note 231, at 332-34 (discussing § 106).
254 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994).
255 See id. §§ 1107, 1203, 1303 (powers and duties of the debtor and debtor-in-possession), 105 (bankruptcy courts' broad equity power),
106 (abrogation and sovereign immunity), 107 (public access to papers filed in bankruptcy court), 108 (extension of time for matters
stayed by bankruptcy filing; extension of time for certain actions by the debtor), 303 (sanctions for filing an involutary case that is
later dismissed), 901 (applicability of other Bankruptcy Code sections to chapter 9 cases).
256 See id. §§ 544-551 (avoidance, including of certain liens), 724 (avoidance of certain liens); 749, 764 (avoidance powers relating to
stockbrokers and commodity brokers); 926 (avoidance powers in municipal bankruptcy cases).
257 See id. §§ 362 (automatic stay); 1201, 1301 (stay relating to co-debtors in chapter 12 and chapter 13 cases); 922 (stay in chapter
9 cases).
258 See id. §§ 944, 1141, 1227, 1327 (binding effect of confirmation in chapter 9, 11, 12, and 13 cases); 1142, 1143 (implementation
of a plan and distribution in chapter 11 cases); 726 (distribution in chapter 7 cases); 523, 524 (discharge, its effects, the discharge
injunction, and exceptions to the injunction); 525 (discrimination against the discharged debtor).
259 See id. §§ 502 (allowance and determination of claims), 503, 1305 (determination of post-petition claims and administrative
expenses), 553 (setoff), 510 (subordination), 726 (order of distribution).
260 See id. §§ 506 (determination of secured status), 552, 928 (post-petition effect of a security interest), 722, 524c (redemption
and reaffirmation), 363 (use, sale and lease of property, including property subject to secured claims), 364 (debtor-in-possession
financing, including imposing a priming lien), 1206 (sale of property free and clear of interests in chapter 12). Section 106(a) does
not, however, apply to § 361 (adequate protection).
261 See id. §§ 346, 728, 1146, 1231 (special tax provisions), 505 (determination of tax liability).
262 See id. §§ 365 (assumption, rejection and assignment of executory contracts and leases), 366 (utilities), 744 (executory contract,
sale of securities, stockbroker liquidation), 929 (municipal leases).
263 See id. §§ 542, 543 (collection of property of the estate in general and from custodians), 522 (exemptions). The abrogation provision
does not, however, apply to actions under § 541. Section 541 defines the scope of the bankruptcy estate's property broadly to include
the debtor's pre-petition causes of action. See id. § 541. The omission of § 541 probably is designed to retain the states' immunity with
respect to general non-bankruptcy law causes of action, such as routine contract and tort actions that become property of the estate
under § 541 and may be prosecuted by the trustee. See generally Gibson, supra note 243, at 330-331 (arguing that the exclusion of
§ 541 was designed to ensure that the trustee could not enforce against the states pre-petition causes of action that the estate inherits
from the debtor under § 541(1), or that the arise only under § 541(7)).
264 11 U.S.C. § 106(a); see supra note 235. The consequences of the government filing a claim are discussed infra at Part IV.B.1 in
the context of consent, waiver and setoff.
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265 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976); see also supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text;
see generally Gibson, supra note 231, at 337-340 (suggesting that § 106 clearly expresses Congress' intent to abrogate immunity).
266 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
267 See supra note 250.
268 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53; see also discussion supra at text accompanying note 179.
269 See Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 635-36, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 602, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1766,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 76559 (7th Cir. 1995), judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1411, 134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996) (involving
a preference action against a state agricultural commodity fund and advisory commission); In re York-Hannover Developments,
Inc., 190 B.R. 62, 65 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (involving an adversary proceeding to recover payments made by the debtor to the Florida
Department of Revenue); In re J.F.D. Enterprises, Inc., 183 B.R. 342, 354, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 521 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)
(involving an adversary proceeding to enjoin the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission); see also Matter of
McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1105, 16 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 218, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
P 71613 (7th Cir. 1987) (decided before Union Gas; holding that Congress had power to abrogate states' immunity under the
Bankruptcy Clause), cert denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987).
In Merchants Grain, Ohio filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court accepted. All 49 other states filed an amicus brief urging
the Court to overrule Union Gas. See Cordry, supra note 137, at 9. The Court's treatment of Merchants Grain is discussed infra
at note 327.
270 See Merchants Grain, 59 F.3d at 634-36; York-Hannover, 190 B.R. at 64-65; J.F.D. Enters., 183 B.R. at 354; see also Gibson, supra
note 231, at 338-339, 344-45 (if Union Gas is upheld, it supports the constitutionality of the 1994 amendment to § 106).
271 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
272 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 98.
273 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 51-57 (White, J., concurring).
274 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104.
275 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring).
277 These are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and O'Connor. Thus, the remaining “votes” on abrogation under
the Bankruptcy Code are two (Scalia and O'Connor; no authority to abrogate) to one (Stevens; Congress has authority to abrogate).
278 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1 (Brennan, J., for the plurality); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Stevens, J., concurring).
279 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Thomas had joined the Court in the interim.
280 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
281 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter joined Justice Stevens in arguing the Congress has power to abrogate states' immunity. See
id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282 Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion. See id. at 44.
283 These are Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Breyer, Ginsburg, Marshall, Stevens, Souter, and even White (who agreed with the result,
but not the reasoning in Union Gas).
284 “Justice Brennan's approach has carried the day with the academic community, although each academic has his or her own variation
on it. But most scholars who have examined the issue in the last twenty years have, through one path or another, come to the
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to prevent Congress from allowing individuals to sue states in federal
court, if Congress chose to do so.”
Field, supra note 19, at 10 (footnote omitted); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2245 (arguing that sovereign immunity is a
common law doctrine, that the abrogation power is clear from the constitutional grant to Congress, and that immunity is like other
common law doctrines that Congress preempts all the time); see generally sources cited supra notes 107-124.
285 These are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 44.
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286 For a history of the people who have come to be known as the Seminole, see PETER MATTHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 27-74
(1979).
287 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
288 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1994).
289 Id. § 2710(d)(1).
290 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i); 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii-vii); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
291 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
292 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 44; id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at 47. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined.
294 Justice Souter wrote a lengthy dissent, which Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens joined. See id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissent. See id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295 Id. at 54.
296 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72.
297 Id. at 68 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23, 54 S. Ct. 745, 78 L. Ed. 1282 (1934) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Dawson, ed., 1876))).
298 Id. at 66.
299 Hans, 134 U.S. 1; see discussion supra at notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
300 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer).
301 Id. at 109-110.
302 See supra notes 107-123, 182-207; see also Meltzer, supra note 82, at 24-25 (summarizing Justice Souter's analysis).
303 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 72.
305 Id. at 66.
306 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
307 Id. The Seminole Court found no reasonable basis for distinguishing the Indian Commerce Clause from the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Seminole, 517 U.S at 55-72.
308 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. There is no more reason to distinguish the Bankruptcy Clause from the Interstate Commerce Clause
than there is to distinguish the Indian Commerce Clause from the Interstate Commerce Clause. See infra note 331 (citing cases
holding that the Bankruptcy Code's abrogation provision is unconstitutional after Seminole); infra note 322 (noting argument by
Professor Melzter that there are stronger arguments for abrogation of states' immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause than
under other Article I powers because the federal government exercises broad, plenary authority over Indian affairs).
309 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit”) (emphasis added).
Indeed, the dissenting justices in Seminole agreed that the Eleventh Amendment limits federal courts' jurisdiction with respect to
suits within the scope of the Amendment, although they argued that federal questions suits do not fall within the scope of the
Amendment. They argued that the implications of imposing a jurisdictional bar demonstrate that the Amendment does not apply to
federal question cases. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 114-15 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. discussion
supra at notes 200-202 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's argument that the phrase “be construed to” prohibits
courts from reading abrogation into Article III itself in the absence of legislative action, but does not limit federal courts' jurisdiction
or prevent Congress from abrogating immunity).
310 See discussion supra at notes 91-130 and accompanying text. See also Balgowan v. State of N.J., 115 F.3d 214, 216, 3 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1703, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (LCP) 1265 (3d Cir. 1997) (Seminole “abruptly changed the law regarding Eleventh
Amendment immunity”); Hurd v. Pittsburg State University, 109 F.3d 1540, 1543, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 95, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
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(BNA) 1448, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 44615 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that Seminole significantly changed immunity law); Field,
supra note 19, at 15 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment holding in Seminole constituted a sharp break with the past.”); id. at 22 (“Seminole
represents a dramatic change in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence ....”); Field, supra note 13, at 537 (suggesting that Seminole
views the Eleventh Amendment as “imposing a constitutional doctrine of immunity;” arguing that there is no historical support for
this view); Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2238 (arguing that Seminole went beyond any fair reading required by precedent); id.
at 2222-23 (arguing that the Seminole majority's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is inconsistent with its plain language,
probably with the drafters' intent, and is “not fully justified by stare decisis”); id. at 2238 (arguing that Seminole “gives constitutional
status to a nontextual common law doctrine of state sovereign immunity as a limitation on powers expressly given to the federal
government”); see also Seminole, 517 U.S. at 115-16 & n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the general theory of sovereignty
underlying the Constitution does not allow state sovereignty to defeat a congressional exercise of power).
311 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 63-73.
312 See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2244-2245 (arguing that Seminole went far beyond Hans in denying Congress power to abrogate
states' immunity; noting that abrogation was not an issue in Hans because Hans presented an issue directly under the Contract
Clause, not under a federal statute); Meltzer, supra note 82, at 27-28 (arguing that Hans embraced Justice Iredell's approach in
Chisholm and that even Justice Iredell seemed to accept that Congress could abrogate states' immunity, he simply did not believe
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had clearly abrogated states' immunity; also noting that Justice Iredell's general statement that no
power existed at common law to sue unconsenting states could be construed to mean that Congress cannot abrogate immunity, but
arguing that this is not consistent with Justice Iredell's analysis of the Judiciary Act; acknowledging that Hans might adopt the view
that Congress may not abrogate immunity, but noting that Hans analyzed the Judiciary Act of 1875 in a way similar to Justice
Iredell's analysis of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
313 See Hans, 134 U.S. 1.
314 See discussion supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
315 Cf. Monaghan, supra note 91, at 106 (suggesting that the argument that sovereign immunity in federal question cases is constitutional
common law that Congress can abrogate and that the Eleventh Amendment applies only to diversity cases is a strained interpretation
of Hans because Hans gave no suggestion that Congress could abrogate immunity).
316 See infra note 603.
317 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 10999 (1976), discussed supra at notes 163-178 and accompanying text.
318 Seminole, 517 U.S at 59 (reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the state/federal relationship subsequent
to the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment and that, when states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, they ceded to Congress
the power to grant private citizens the right to enforce against the states in federal court federal laws enacted to implement the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment).
319 Fitzpatrick's Fourteenth Amendment rationale is “wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause.” Seminole, 517 U.S. at
66. The Fitzpatrick Court's reasoning ought to apply to the other Civil War Amendments which, like the Fourteenth Amendment,
alter the federal/state balance. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XV; see also Field, supra note 136, at 1228 & n.120. The same
argument might be made with respect to amendments that contain similar implementing clauses, such as the Nineteenth and Twenty-
first Amendments. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, XXI § 2.
320 See supra notes 197-199. Professor Field argues that the congressional abrogation power is limited only if Congress attempts
to regulate an essential state government function. In that case, the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to abrogate states'
immunity without the states' consent. In other cases, however, Congress should be able to condition states' participation in federal
programs on states' waiver of immunity. She views this as the true import of the Civil War Amendments and of Fitzpatrick. See
Field, supra note 136, at 1230-39.
321 The Eleventh Amendment became effective in 1798. The Fourteenth Amendment became effective in 1868. Even if Hans had
expressly extended the Eleventh Amendment to federal question suits, Hans was not decided until 1890. See Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
322 See Meltzer, supra note 82, at 21-22 (arguing that the majority's rationale fails to “seek to make sense of the whole,” reconcile
the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted before the Eleventh Amendment was extended to federal question suits, or
reconcile Congress' exclusive regulation of Indian affairs).
323 See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410,
134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Okl., 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S.
972, 116 S. Ct. 435, 133 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1995) and cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410, 134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996)
and (overruling recognized by, Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997)); Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian
Reservation v. Jessup, 39 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410, 134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996)
and judgment vacated, 85 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 1996) supra; Fort Belknap Indian Community of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation v.
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State of Mont., 39 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410, 134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996) and
judgment vacated, 84 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1996) supra.
324 See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 91 F.3d 1350 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's dismissal of IGRA case
against the state and its officials); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Okl., 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's
dismissal of IGRA case against the state); Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation v. Jessup, 85 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same); Fort Belknap Indian Community of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation v. State of Mont., 84 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1996) (same);
see also Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of Neb., 121 F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal
of IGRA suit against state; holding that state had not waived immunity).
325 See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 620, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 517 U.S. 1184, 116 S. Ct. 1667, 134 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1996) and cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1187, 116 S. Ct. 1672, 134
L. Ed. 2d 776 (1996) (holding that federal Copyright Act abrogates states' federal court immunity) (reversing district court's denial
of states' immunity defense; holding that abrogation was unconstitutional).
326 See Mueller v. Reich, 54 F.3d 438, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1217, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33236 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1077, 137 L. Ed. 2d 212, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1376 (U.S. 1997) (holding that
abrogation was unconstitutional and that the state did not waive its immunity).
327 See Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 602, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1766, Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH) P 76559 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1411, 134 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. 1996). The debtor
had sued to recover a preference from the state fund, which served as guarantor for a number of individual farmers. Because the
state asserted immunity, the debtor also sued the farmers directly. After the Supreme Court remanded the action against the state,
the Seventh Circuit stayed the action on remand pending an appeal of the related preference action against the farmers. Id.
328 See, e.g., Abril v. Com. of Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33686 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that Congress could not abrogate states' immunity using its Interstate Commerce Clause powers, and that Congress'
attempt to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act was not a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers); Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Com. of Pa., 141 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity under the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act, but does have such power under the Fourteenth Amendment); Balgowan v. State of N.J., 115 F.3d 214, 216,
3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1703, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (LCP) 1265 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that federal courts have no jurisdiction
over citizen suits against states under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Close v. State of N.Y., 125 F.3d 31, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.
2d (BNA) 108, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33580 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power to abrogate states'
immunity under the Lanham Trade-mark Act); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 123 F.3d 427, 74 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 553, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 44870 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immuity under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; staying district court
action pending determination whether Congress has power to do so under the Fourteenth Amendment); Mills v. State of Me., 118
F.3d 37, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1802, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33585 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power
to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dept., 111 F.3d 585, 3 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1540, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33521 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 3 Wage
& Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 929, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33450, 1996 FED App. 343P (6th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of
reh'g, 107 F.3d 358, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1501 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Garrett v. Board of Trustees of University
of Alabama in Birmingham, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1247 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that Congress has no power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that the accommodation provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act were not valid exercises of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers); Rodriguez v. Texas Com'n of Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding
that Congress has no power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Copyright Act); Bergemann v. State of
R.I., 958 F. Supp. 61, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1495 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that Congress has no authority under the Interstate
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Digiore v. State of Ill.,
962 F. Supp. 1064, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1542, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33543 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that Congress
has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Frazier v.
Courter, 958 F. Supp. 252, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1662, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33592 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding that the
Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted under Congress' Interstate Commerce Clause power, and that Congress may not abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting legislation pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, no matter how clear its
intent to do so may be); Hodgson v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 963 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (holding that Congress
did not abrogate Mississippi's immunity under a valid exercise of power because Congress enacted the Crime Control Consent Act
and approved the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, which does not
permit Congress to abrogate states' immunity); Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, 958 F. Supp. 439,
117 Ed. Law Rep. 606, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1004 (D. Minn. 1997), aff'd, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 679 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments, which were enacted as part of the Federal Labor
Standards Act were not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and do not abrogate states' immunity because the Fourteenth
Amendment is the only constitutional provision that accords Congress authority to legislate over the states' immunity); Larry v.
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 975 F. Supp. 1447, 121 Ed. Law Rep. 673 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that Congress has
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no power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the Equal Pay Act provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act because the provision was not premised upon the Fourteenth Amendment); Palotai v. University of Maryland College Park, 959
F. Supp. 714, 118 Ed. Law Rep. 89 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that Congress has no authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Rowlands v. Pointe Mouillee Shooting Club,
959 F. Supp. 422, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 21167 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power to abrogate states' immunity
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) because Congress enacted RCRA pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause and not the Fourteenth Amendment); Vazquez Morales v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 967 F. Supp. 42 (D.P.R.
1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) claim
against territory and territorial university because the Social Security Act — of which the Medicare scheme, including EMTALA,
forms a part — is an exercise of Congress' power under Article I to tax and to regulate interstate commerce); Whalen v. State of
Ariz., 962 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate
states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Arnold v. State of Ark., 957 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (holding that the
federal court has no jurisdiction over a suit against a state under the Fair Labor Standards Act because Congress has no authority
under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate states' immunity); Blow v. State of Kan., 929 F. Supp. 1400, 3 Wage & Hour
Cas. 2d (BNA) 627, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33445 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 489, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1792, 133
Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33549 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate
states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Chauvin v. State of La. and Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, 937 F. Supp.
567, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 927, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33457 (E.D. La. 1996) (same); MacPherson v. University of
Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 113 Ed. Law Rep. 301, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1318, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 44327
(N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 139 F.3d 1426, 8 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 341, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1201 (11th
Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Prisco v. State of New York, 1996 WL 596546 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that immunity cannot be abrogated absent congressional legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or waiver by the
state; dismissing claims under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); Rehberg v. Department
of Public Safety, 946 F. Supp. 741, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1149, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33526 (S.D. Iowa 1996), aff'd,
117 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act could not abrogate states' immunity from suit in federal
court because it was not enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Taylor v. Com. of Va., 951 F. Supp. 591, 3 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1199 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate
Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burton, 949 F.
Supp. 1546, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 703 (D. Wyo. 1996) (holding that Congress has no power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act); Walden v. Florida
Dept. of Corrections, 975 F. Supp. 1330, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 33644 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that Congress has no power to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act because the Act was enacted pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Gorka by Gorka v. Sullivan, 82 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying
state's motion for removal and directing remand to state court because removal is permitted only if the federal court would have
had original jurisdiction and, under Seminole, the federal courts have no jurisdiction if the state is a defendant; discussed infra at
notes 609-612); but cf. Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1179
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress abrogated states' immunity under a valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers when it amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to apply to the states). See also infra note 350 (discussing
Bankruptcy Code cases); Part IV.A.3 (discussing abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Courts dismissed other cases for lack of a clear abrogation provision. See, e.g., Fiedler v. State of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that the Tax Injunction Act, which permits a federal court remedy where a state court remedy is inadequate, does
not abrogate state's immunity); Darne v. State of Wis., Department of Revenue, 137 F.3d 484, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2569 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the pre-emption provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not implicitly
abrogate states' immunity).
329 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2919, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P
11635 (1st Cir. 1996) (involving suit against a Puerto Rico state agency under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act).
330 See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp. 993, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 650, 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that
Congress could not, under its Article I War Powers, abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act [“USERRA”] suits brought against state employers); Palmatier v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
981 F. Supp. 529, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that Congress did not effectively abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted USERRA pursuant to the War Powers Clause; argues that Diaz-Gandia should not be
followed because its reasoning was based on Union Gas).
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